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An important element of successful engineering design is the effective management of 
resources to support design decisions.  Design decisions can be thought of as having two 
phases—a formulation phase and a solution phase.  As part of the formulation phase, 
engineers must decide how much information to collect and which models to use to 
support the design decision.  Since more information and more accurate models come at a 
greater cost, a cost-benefit trade-off must be made.  Previous work has considered such 
trade-offs in decision problems when all aspects of the decision problem can be 
represented using precise probabilities, an assumption that is not justified when 
information is sparse.   
 
In this thesis, we use imprecise probabilities to manage the information cost-benefit 
trade-off for two decision problems in which the quality of the information is imprecise: 
1) The decision of when to stop collecting statistical data about a quantity that is 
characterized by a probability distribution with unknown parameters; and 2) The 
selection of the most preferred model to help guide a particular design decision when the 
model accuracy is characterized as an interval.  For each case, a separate novel approach 
is developed in which the principles of information economics are incorporated into the 
information management decision.   
 
The problem of statistical data collection is explored with a pressure vessel design.  This 
design problem requires the characterization of the probability distribution that describes 
 
xiv 
a novel material’s strength.  The model selection approach is explored with the design of 
an I-beam structure.  The designer must decide how accurate of a model to use to predict 
the maximum deflection in the span of the structure.  For both problems, it is concluded 
that the information economic approach developed in this thesis can assist engineers in 






Engineering design is a sequential and iterative process, consisting of five phases: 
product planning, clarification of task, conceptual design, embodiment design, and detail 
design (Pahl and Beitz 1996).  Decision making is an important part of each of these 
phases and is formalized in decision-based design research (Thurston 1990; Hazelrigg 
1996; Marston, Allen et al. 2000).  Figure 1 shows a flowchart of the decision process 
(Clemen 1996).  At the beginning of the decision, the decision maker (DM) identifies the 
decision situation and his or her objectives.  The solution alternatives are then identified 
and the decision problem is decomposed and modeled so that it can be solved in a 
systematic way.  Based on the decomposition and modeling, a best alternative is chosen 
and some sensitivity analysis is performed to test how sensitive the choice of the best 
alternative is to the decision problem parameters and the decomposition and modeling 
methods.  Using the results from the sensitivity analysis, it is decided that either the 





Figure 1: A decision process flowchart, adapted from (Clemen 1996) 
 
This thesis focuses the elements that are bolded in Figure 1.  Specifically, it addresses the 
sub-decision problems regarding what information to gather (updating the model of 
uncertainty) and which models to use to guide the decision (selecting a model of the 
problem structure). 
1.1 Motivation 
Although better information and models may provide value to the designers by leading to 
a better final design, whether an information source is valuable cannot be known with 
certainty.  Until resources are spent acquiring information or developing models, the 
Identify the decision situation and 
understand the objectives.
Identify alternatives.
Decompose and model the problem:
1. Model of the problem structure.
2. Model of uncertainty.
3.  Model of preferences.
Choose the best alternative.
Sensitivity Analysis






exact information obtained from the information source is unknown and its value is 
therefore uncertain.  This thesis presents an approach for integrating the management of 
this cost-benefit tradeoff into the design decision model using the principles defined as 
information economics (Marschak 1974).  Economics is the study of choice under 
conditions of scarcity (Lieberman and Hall 2000).  Extending this definition, information 
economics is the study of choice in information collection and management when 
resources, such as time and money, to expend on information are scarce.   
 
Motivating Question:   
How should a decision maker decide on resource allocations when gathering information 
in support of design decisions? 
Hypothesis: 
The principles of information economics can guide resource allocation by predicting 
bounds on the value of gathering additional information and of developing better models. 
 
In current engineering practice, the principles of information economics are rarely used to 
guide information collection decisions.  Four examples common in engineering practice 
are provided below, each of which illustrates the lack of an information economic 
perspective. 
 
Statistical data collection:  When collecting statistical data, a DM will often specify a 
confidence level for which he or she wishes to be sure that one design alternative 
outperforms another.  Given an initial set of collected data, an estimate of the number of 
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data samples required to conclude the superiority of one alternative over another at the 
specified confidence level can be derived using statistical principles based on the 
assumption that the true distribution is Gaussian.  This approach has two flaws: 1) The 
DM has no systematic guidance in specifying an appropriate confidence level; usually a 
confidence level of 90%, 95%, or 99% is specified, often without much analysis of the 
design problem.  2) The required number of additional data samples is independent of the 
cost of data collection.  It may be prohibitively costly to collect the required amount of 
additional data.  Without information economic principles, the DM is left with little 
guidance for information collection decisions in such cases. 
 
Monte Carlo analysis:  When performing a Monte Carlo analysis of a discrete event 
simulation, the DM uses an approach similar to that for statistical data collection to 
determine the number of simulation replicates required such that a hypothesis can be 
verified at a specified confidence level.  Again, the cost of collecting data—in this case 
performing simulations—is not taken into account.  If the simulation is very complex, the 
cost of performing the simulations can be a major factor in the DM’s choice of the 
number of replicates.  Information economics provides a framework to manage explicitly 
the trade-off between the more accurate knowledge attained by performing additional 
simulation replicates and the cost of performing such simulations. 
 
Model selection:  In general, the DM has little systematic guidance in model selection.  
To compensate for this lack of guidance, he or she will often be conservative and choose 
to acquire and use a model that is more accurate then is really required, spending 
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additional resources unnecessarily.  In addition, each design decision may benefit most 
from a different model.  The choice of the best model in support of a given design 
decision depends on the preference of the DM, the uncertainty in other problem 
parameters, the importance (in dollars) of the decision, etc.  Clearly, a framework that 
allows the DM to trade-off explicitly the value derived from using more accurate models 
with the cost of such models would be useful. 
 
Finite element models:  A more structured model selection decision faced by the DM is 
the choice of the number of elements to use in a finite element model.  In current 
practice, the DM studies the convergence of the finite element model as the number of 
elements is increased.  The DM then selects a number of elements that will yield a result 
within a specified error tolerance.  But such an approach does not factor in the cost of 
running the selected model, which can be significant for complex models.  Information 
economics provides a framework for which the DM’s accuracy preferences and the cost 
of running the model can be traded off explicitly. 
 
This thesis addresses two of these information collection decisions.  Specifically, this 
thesis develops and presents information economic approaches for decisions about 
statistical data collection and model selection.  These approaches are explored on a 




1.1.1 Research question 1 and hypothesis 
DMs often face the decision of when to stop collecting statistical data during the process 
of characterizing a probability distribution that describes a random process.  For example, 
a DM may want to build a concrete structure out of a new type of concrete mix.  To 
decide whether or not this new concrete mix should be used, its performance is tested.  It 
is assumed that the yield strength is well modeled as a normally distributed random 
variable, but that the parameters of the normal distribution are unknown.  The DM can 
estimate the parameters by testing samples to failure and recording the failure stress of 
each.  But how many samples are needed to make an accurate determination of the new 
mix’s strength distribution?  Certainly, one is too few and one million would probably be 
too many, but how can the DM decide how many specimen should be tested?  Is there a 
correct number?   
 
Research Question 1: 
How should a decision maker decide when to stop gathering statistical data when trying 
to characterize a probability distribution describing a random event? 
Hypothesis: 
The principles of information economics allow the DM to bound the value of the next 
statistical data point and these bounds can guide the DM towards better decisions about 
statistical data collection. 
 
Taking an information economic perspective, we come to the realization that once a 
certain amount of data has been collected, the cost of gathering additional samples 
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becomes greater than the benefit that the additional samples provide.  Using information 
economic principles, the DM can monitor the cost and benefit of additional data 
collection throughout the data collection process and identify the point when the benefit 
is outweighed by the cost.  In general, the DM should collect data samples until this point 
is reached.  Information economic principles allow the DM to explicitly manage the 
trade-off between the accuracy of his or her knowledge and the cost of data collection. 
 
Necessary background knowledge for addressing research question 1 is provided in 
Chapter 2.  The derivation of an information economic approach to statistical data 
collection and an application is presented in Chapter 3. 
1.1.2 Research question 2 and hypothesis 
In many design problems, the DM must decide which of several engineering models to 
develop to support a decision.  More accurate models yield more accurate knowledge but 
at a greater cost―another trade-off.  If given the choice of several models, which one 
should the DM select?  Is there a correct choice?   
 
Research Question 2: 
How should a decision maker select the most preferred model given a particular design 
problem? 
Hypothesis:   
The principles of information economics allow the value of more accurate models to be 




An information economic approach allows the DM to systematically predict the amount 
of value that different models would contribute to the particular design decision based on 
the model’s accuracy.  With such information, the DM can explicitly manage the cost-
benefit trade-off between model accuracy and model cost, allowing the most preferred 
model to be selected. 
 
Necessary background knowledge for addressing research question 2 is provided in 
Chapter 2.  In Chapter 4, an approach for bounding the value of more accurate models 
using information economics is derived and an application is presented. 
1.2 Organization of Thesis 
The organization of the thesis is illustrated in Figure 2.  Chapter 1 provides motivation 
for the problem and highlights the research questions to be answered.  Chapter 2 
overviews relevant knowledge, literature, and previous work.  Chapter 3 addresses 
research question 1 by deriving an information economic approach to decisions about 
statistical data collection and explores the approach with an example pressure vessel 
design.  Chapter 4 addresses research question 2 and explores a derived information 
economic approach to model selection in the context of the design of an I-beam structure.  






Figure 2: The organization of this thesis 
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This chapter provides an overview of topics that are foundational to this thesis and 
describes related research from the engineering community.  The purpose of this chapter 
is to familiarize the reader with the background knowledge necessary to better understand 
the remainder of this thesis and to bring to light some of the limitations that exist in the 
literature. 
 
The chapter begins with an overview of imprecise probabilities followed by an 
explanation of payoff and utility functions, functions used by the designer to express 
preferences, i.e., judge the success of design alternatives.  By integrating imprecise 
probabilities and the designer’s utility function, we arrive at imprecise utility functions an 
imprecise characterization of preferences that is no longer transitive.  To make decisions 
based on imprecise utility functions, decision policies under imprecision are required, the 
next topic in the chapter.  The chapter then describes the principles of information 
economics and explains how we can think of the information cost-benefit trade-offs in 
engineering design in relation to such principles.  The chapter concludes with a summary 
of related research from the engineering design community and identifies the knowledge 
gap that is addressed in this thesis.  Additional background information is provided 
throughout the thesis where needed.  A broader investigation of information economics 
and uncertainty in engineering design can be found in the Ph.D. dissertation of Jason 
Aughenbaugh (Aughenbaugh 2006).   
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2.1 Imprecise probabilities 
Uncertainty is often represented using probabilities.  From among the many possible 
interpretations of probability (Savage 1972; de Finetti 1980; Walley 1991; Joslyn and 
Booker 2005), we use a subjective interpretation of probability.  We avoid a frequentist 
interpretation, under which a probability represents the ratio of times that one outcome 
occurs compared to the total number of outcomes in a series of identical, repeatable, and 
possibly random trials.  While there may be random variables that assume outcomes 
according to true relative frequencies, we choose the subjective interpretation because the 
true relative frequencies cannot be determined with any finite number of data samples, 
and because a subjective interpretation is applicable to a broader class of problems, as it 
is not limited to repeatable events.  Naturally, subjective probabilities should be 
consistent with available information, including knowledge about observed relative 
frequencies and the DM’s actual beliefs; such probabilities can be considered rationalist 
subjective probabilities (Walley 1991). 
 
Under a subjective interpretation, probabilities are an expression of belief based on an 
individual’s willingness to bet (de Finetti 1980; Winkler 1996; Joslyn and Booker 2005).  
Every bet has a price associated with it, and one can either buy or sell a bet at that price.  
The use of precise probabilities presumes that a DM can determine exactly the price at 
which he or she is indifferent between buying and selling the bet, the DM’s so-called fair 




The use of imprecise probabilities allows for a range of prices at which a DM would 
neither buy nor sell the bet, because he or she is not sure how betting at these prices will 
affect his or her expected payoff.  For instance, consider a bent quarter.  The DM is 
uncertain about whether it will land heads-up or tails-up on a given toss; and until he or 
she has seen it flipped many times, he or she is also uncertain about how probable it is 
that it will land heads-up or tails-up.  However, the DM is confident that the probability 
of the bent quarter landing heads-up is greater than 0.3 and less than 0.6.  The DM can 
state such a belief using imprecise probabilities as ( ) [ ]0.3,0.6P H = .  If a bet was 
established that paid $1 for the outcome of heads-up, then the DM would buy this bet at 
any amount less then $0.30 and sell it at any amount greater then $0.60.  The DM would 
neither buy nor sell the bet for any amount between $0.30 and $0.60 because he or she 
would be unsure as to how such bets would affect his or her expected payoff. 
 
In theory, imprecise probabilities can be reduced to precise probabilities by collecting 
infinite evidence and expending infinite effort to elicit the DM’s beliefs.  In the example 
problems, we are explicitly assuming a finite amount of evidence, such that precise 
probabilities are unattainable. We therefore use imprecise probabilities to capture the 
DM’s current state of information. 
 
Imprecise probabilities have been formalized by Walley (Walley 1991), and the value of 
using imprecise probabilities in certain engineering design decisions has been 
demonstrated previously (Aughenbaugh and Paredis 2005).  We extend this work to 
estimate the value of information through the application of information economics and 
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imprecise probabilities.  Imprecise probabilities allow for the value of future information 
to be predicted as explained in Chapter 3.  Other common representations of imprecision 
in probabilities can be found in the multi-attribute decision-making literature including 
ordinal ranking of probabilities (Sarin 1978; Weber 1987) and probabilities subject to 
linear constraints (Kmietowicz and Pearman 1984).   
2.2 The probability-box 
In this thesis, we use a probability-box or p-box (Ferson and Donald 1998), to represent 
imprecise probabilities.  A p-box incorporates both imprecision and probabilistic 
characterizations by expressing interval bounds on the cumulative probability 
distribution function (CDF) for a random variable.  More formally, the bounds on a p-
box, such as shown in Figure 3(a), are given by two CDFs ( 1F  and 2F ) that enclose a set 
of CDFs that are consistent with the current state of information and the DM’s beliefs.  
The p-box shown in Figure 3(a) is for a random variable Z  with known variance 2 1σ =  
and mean bounded by the interval [ ]µ= 0,1 . Thus extending the notation of probability, 
we can write ~  ([0,1] ,1)Z N .   
 





















































The true CDF is unknown, and any of the infinite number of normal CDFs with 2 1σ =  
inside the p-box could be the true one, such as those shown in Figure 3(b).  Although p-
boxes are not restricted to characterizing normal distributions, we limit our discussion to 
this case in the interest of clarity. 
 
Only recently have researchers addressed the construction of p-boxes from sample data 
(Ferson, Hajagos et al. 2005).  While several approaches exist (Ferson, Hajagos et al. 
2005), we choose a pragmatic approach based on standard statistical confidence intervals.  
In this thesis, we assume the random variable ( )X  is normally distributed, but with 
unknown mean and variance: 
2~ ( , )X Normal µ σ . (1)
One basis of reference for the true but unknown µ  and 2σ  are the minimum variance 















s x xσ − =
= = −∑  
(3)
where the ix ’s are realizations of the random variable, and n  is the sample size.  These 
quantities are called respectively the sample mean and sample variance and are 
commonly used in pure probabilistic approaches.  In order to construct a p-box, we 
broaden these point estimates to confidence intervals.  In this experiment, a 95% 
confidence level is used. 
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2.2.1 Confidence interval for the mean 
Since 1x , 2x , …, nx  is a random sample from a normal distribution with unknown mean 







is the t distribution with 1n −  degrees of freedom.  Letting 2, 1ntα −  be the upper 2α  
percentage point of the t distribution with 1n −  degrees of freedom, it can be shown that 
{ }2, 1 2, 1 1n nP t t tα α α− −− ≤ ≤ = − . (5)
Substituting for t  in Equation (4) and solving for the mean µ , we arrive at a 
( )1 100%α−  confidence interval for the mean 
/ 2, 1 / 2, 1ˆ ˆ[ , ] [ , ]n nt s n t s nα αµ µ µ µ− −= − + . 
(6)
2.2.2 Confidence interval for the variance 
Since 1x , 2x , …, nx  is a random sample from a normal distribution with unknown mean 









is chi-square with 1n −  degrees of freedom, where n  is the sample size and 2s  is the 
sample variance (Hines, Montgomery et al. 2003).  To develop the confidence interval, 
we note that 
{ }2 221 2, 1 2, 1 1n nP α αχ χ χ α− − −≤ ≤ = − . (8)
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Substituting for 2χ  in Equation (7) and solving for the variance 2σ , we arrive at a 
( )1 100%α−  confidence interval for the variance 
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A table of t  and 2χ  values is found in most probability and statistic books, such as 
(Hines, Montgomery et al. 2003). 
2.3 The payoff of a decision 
There are two layers to simulation-based design: deciding which models to use to guide 
the design decision and the design decision itself.  The value of both decisions is 
measured by the success of the design (i.e. the design decision).  The outcome of a 
decision problem can be represented by a payoff function, ( , )x aπ , that depends on both 
the chosen action a  and the realized state of the world x .  Because of uncertainty in the 
state of the world x , the DM cannot know the outcomes, or payoff, of any action with 
certainty.   
 
We measure the payoff in terms of utility.  As originally proposed by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1980), utility analysis is used for making 
decisions under uncertainty in traditional statistical decision theory (Pratt, Raiffa et al. 
1995).  In general, utility expresses preference—more preferred decision outcomes are 
assigned higher utility values.  If chosen correctly, utility reflects the DM’s preferences 
even under uncertainty.  By applying the expected value operator, the DM weights all 
possible outcomes according to their likelihood of occurring, and then chooses the action 
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that maximizes the expected utility.  For a general overview of utility theory see 
(Fishburn 1982; Keeney and Raiffa 1993). 
2.4 Decision policies under imprecision 
When imprecise probabilities are mapped through a utility function the result is imprecise 
utilities, i.e. intervals of utility, see Figure 4.  A special class of decision policies is 
needed to make decisions based on imprecise utilities.  The simplest of these decision 
policies is interval dominance, which states that any interval that is completely dominated 
by another interval can be eliminated from consideration.  From Figure 4, we see that 
interval of utility for design alternative 3 is dominated by the interval of utility for both of 
the other design alternatives; therefore, design alternative 3 can be eliminated from 
consideration.   
 
 
Figure 4: Imprecise utility intervals for three design alternatives 
 
But what about making a decision between design alternative 1 and design alternative 2?  













utility intervals leads to indeterminacy.  Since a decision must be made even if the utility 
intervals overlap, a decision policy that can resolve this ambiguity is required.  Possible 
policies for making decisions under imprecision include maximality (Walley 1991), 
maximax (Berger 1985; Schervish, Seidenfeld et al. 2003), maximin (Wald 1950), E-
admissibility (Schervish, Seidenfeld et al. 2003), and the Hurwicz criterion (Arrow and 
Hurwicz 1972; French 1988). 
 
For this thesis we chose to use the Hurwicz criterion, which generalizes the maximax and 
maximin decision policies and provides a flexible framework for decisions under 
imprecision.  The Hurwicz decision criterion uses an optimism-pessimism index, 
0 1α≤ ≤ , which represents the DM’s level of pessimism.  If 1α = , the DM is entirely 
pessimistic and chooses to use a maximin decision policy, while if 0α = , the DM is 
entirely optimistic and chooses a maximax decision policy.  Other values of α  move the 
decision point, Uα ,  between these two extremes according to the equation 
( )1U U Uα α α= + −  as illustrated in Figure 5. 
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2.5 Information economics 
The area of information economics grew out of statistical decision theory in the 1950s 
when Marschak published a series of papers on the economics of information and 
organization (Marschak 1974).  Recently, with the explosion of new information 
technologies, information economics has regained attention within the broader context of 
information management.  Current areas of research focus on corporate finance and 
industry policy, such as intellectual property rights, industry regulation, and fostering 
innovation (Rubin 1983; Strassmann 1999), or on the infusion of information technology 
into a corporation (Strassmann 2004).  Within engineering, the focus of information 
management has been primarily on data exchange, interoperability, and visualization to 
support collaborative design.  For an overview of these areas, refer to the following 
review articles (Ciocoiu, Gruninger et al. 2001; Jayaram, Vance et al. 2001; Rangan and 
Chadha 2001; Szykman, Sriram et al. 2001; Urban, Dietrich et al. 2001).   
 
In a more general sense, information economics presents principles by which the cost-
benefit tradeoffs of information collection can be managed in engineering design.  The 
principles can be summarized by the following statement: the DM should only purchase 
information that has positive net value.  These principles have been developed and 
employed previously in standard micro-economics and the theory of the economic value 
of information, pioneered by Marschak (Marschak 1974) and summarized by Lawrence 
(Lawrence 1999).  A substantial difference between engineering design applications and 
those of Marschak and Lawrence is the availability of perfect knowledge—knowledge 
that Marschak and Lawrence assume to be available, but engineers often lack in practice. 
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2.6 Cost-benefit tradeoffs of information 
As a designer collects more information, the marginal benefit of acquiring additional 
information decreases.  For example, say the designer wishes to characterize the stress-
strain curve of a novel material by testing the failure strength of material samples.  If the 
designer has only tested 10 samples, an 11th test will usually be quite valuable; in 
contrast, if the designer has tested 1000 samples, the 1001st test will be considerably less 
valuable.  In this sense, information displays diminishing returns.  At some point, the cost 
of gathering additional information will outweigh the benefit.  Thus, the value of a 
sample is not merely inherent in the sample; rather, the value is measured as viewed from 
the perspective of the DM.  A fundamental principle of information economics is that a 
DM should continue to collect information only as long as there is an information source 
available whose net value is positive.  Putting the example problem into more standard 
micro-economic terms, a rational DM stops collecting data samples at the point where the 
marginal benefit of the next sample is less than or equal to the marginal cost of acquiring 
it. 
 
A formalization of the basic cost-benefit analysis noted above has been summarized in 
the context of information by Lawrence (Lawrence 1999).  In his work, the measure by 
which information can be managed is value. 
2.7 Related research in engineering design 
In related research, Gupta et al. have demonstrated the importance of incorporating the 
cost (in terms of number of design alternatives considered) of decision making into the 
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overall design decision model (Gupta and Xu 2002), but they do not provide an approach 
for estimating the value of information in actual design problems.  Radhakrishnan and 
McAdams consider the cost-benefit trade-offs in selecting models of various levels of 
abstraction in engineering design (Radhakrishnan and McAdams 2005).  They present a 
framework in which a designer can reason about model uncertainty, but they admit that 
the designer is left with little guidance in estimating the actual value of information from 
different models.  Along similar lines, Bradley and Agogino develop a decision-analytic 
approach to assist designers in cost-benefit analysis of resource expenditures using 
precisely characterized probability distributions to guide and prioritize information 
collection (Bradley and Agogino 1994), but they do not explain how to estimate these 
distributions.   
 
Howard develops a theory of the value of information which takes into account both 
probabilistic and economic factors in decisions and uses this theory to determine the 
optimal number of tests to perform to characterize a known distribution with unknown 
parameters (Howard August 1966; Howard November 1965).  Matheson extends 
Howard’s theory and uses it to determine the most economic computations and analyses 
to perform for a particular decision problem (Matheson September 1968).  Although 
Howard’s and Matheson’s works are similar in objective to this thesis, their approach 
depends on the designer’s ability to accurately assign precise probabilities to the possible 




In the simulation literature, statistical output analysis is commonly performed to assess 
whether a sufficient number of simulation replicates have been performed to obtain 
statistically significant conclusions (Law and Kelton 2000).  However, since the analysis 
is performed based on accuracy requirements, one cannot easily formulate this trade-off 
with respect to the simulation cost.  As in any kind of cost-benefit analysis (Layard and 
Glaister 1994), a common unit of measure is needed.  This need can be met by using the 
economic value of information (Lawrence 1999).   
 
Although the economic value of information is clearly correlated with accuracy, they are 
not equivalent.  For example, when distinguishing between two alternatives that differ 
significantly in performance, a very accurate and expensive model is less valuable than a 
simpler model that could have made the same distinction at a much lower cost.  
Conversely, in high-risk design problems, an expensive model that is more accurate than 
typically required may lead to a better solution even when factoring in costs, since a 
simple model may lead to a decision with disastrous consequences. 
2.8 Identification of knowledge gap addressed in this thesis 
Two research communities have presented approaches for managing the cost-benefit 
trade-offs of information collection.  The design community has developed frameworks 
for managing this trade-off based on strong assumptions about the amount of knowledge, 
either by assuming that the value of information is known, that knowledge about the 
outcome of information collection is known, or that the DM can specify accurate 
probabilities distributions prior to the collection of information.  Consequently, these 
frameworks are not easily applied to engineering problems in which such strong 
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assumption are invalid.  The statistics community has provided an approach that uses 
statistical significance levels as the metric for managing the information cost-benefit 
trade-off, but the cost of information collection is not taken into account.  We postulate 
that the DM is not directly interested in the increase in statistical significance that 
information provides; instead, he or she is interested in how much the information 
increases the net value of the design; net value is the benefit that the information provides 
minus the cost of collecting that information.   
 
This thesis proposes approaches that use the economic value of information to manage 
the information cost-benefit trade-off and overcomes many of the difficulties encountered 
by the design community by representing the DM’s knowledge using imprecise 
probabilities.  The approaches proposed unite the information economic framework 
developed by Lawrence (Lawrence 1999) with the axiomatic theory for imprecise 
probabilities developed by Walley (Walley 1991).  The P-box formalism developed by 
Ferson (Ferson and Donald 1998) is used to characterize imprecise probabilities in a 
representational and computationally tractable form.  Representing the imprecision in the 
DM’s knowledge allows us to bound the value of future information; bounds that can be 
used to guide the information cost-benefit trade-off.  Such guidance allows for the 
explicit management of the information cost-benefit trade-off in a broader class of 
engineering design problems. 
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3 Managing the collection of statistical information 
under uncertainty using information economics* 
 
 
An important element of successful engineering design is the effective management of 
resources to support design decisions.  Design decisions can be thought of as having two 
phases—a formulation phase and a solution phase.  As part of the formulation phase, 
engineers must decide what information to collect and use to support the design decision.  
Since information comes at a cost, a cost-benefit trade-off must be made.  Previous work 
has considered such trade-offs in cases in which all relevant probability distributions 
were precisely known.  However, engineers frequently must characterize these 
distributions by gathering sample data during the information collection phase of the 
decision process.  This characterization is crucial in high-risk design problems where 
uncommon events with severe consequences play a significant role in decisions.  In this 
chapter, we introduce the principles of information economics to guide decisions on 
information collection.  We investigate how designers can bound the value of information 
in the case of distributions with unknown parameters by using imprecise probabilities to 
characterize the current state of information.  We explore the basic performance, 
subtleties, and limitations of the approach in the context of characterizing the strength of 
a novel material for the design of a pressure vessel. 
                                                 
* This chapter has been published in the Journal of Mechanical Design Ling, J. M., J. M. 
Aughenbaugh and C. J. J. Paredis (2006). “Managing the Collection of Information under 
Uncertainty Using Information Economics.” Journal of Mechanical Design (July 2006). 
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3.1 Example Problem 
Throughout this chapter, we discuss the application of information economics in the 
context of an example of a pressure vessel design.  This example has been used 
previously to demonstrate the value of using imprecise probabilities in engineering 
design decisions (Aughenbaugh and Paredis 2005).  We now extend this experiment to 
explore the decision of how much information to collect in order to support design 
decisions. 
 
In the example problem, a pressure vessel is designed to meet certain requirements while 
maximizing payoff.  The complication is that the pressure vessel is to be built using a 
material with unknown yield strength.  It is assumed that the yield strength is well 
modeled as a normally distributed random variable, but that the parameters of the normal 
distribution are unknown.  Yield strength tests can be performed, thus sampling the 
distribution at a cost c per test.   
 
In this experiment, each yield strength test represents one sample from the true material 
strength distribution, a normal distribution whose parameters are unknown to the 
designers.  Specifically, the material strength is a random variable X  such that:  
2~ ( , )X N µ σ . (10)
The mean µ  and variance 2σ  are unknown, and the goal of the information collection is 
to accurately estimate these parameters such that a good design decision can be made.  
The experiment consists of drawing a set of n  samples =1{ }ni ix  from X .  Each sample ix  
that is drawn from the distribution is a piece of information that can be used to help 
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characterize the true nature of the uncertainty.  Unless the designers have infinite 
resources, they cannot collect the infinite number of samples necessary for a perfect 
characterization of the distribution.  Instead, they need to determine when to stop 
collecting information—in this case, data samples. 
3.2 Mathematical Problem Formulation 
In engineering design, the value of information can be measured by observing how the 
information affects the design decision.  In this section, we explain the basic principles of 
information economics and illustrate this framework with a simple example in which 
precise probability distributions are assumed. 
3.2.1 Specifying probabilities over the state space 
The set of all possible states of the world form a state space { }X x= .  In the example 
problem, the state of the world is the actual material strength x  of the material used in a 
particular pressure vessel.  The material strength, or state, is assumed to be normally 
distributed with associated probability density function ( )p x , with parameters that are 
unknown to the designer.  The state of the world is outside the DM’s control, so the DM 
can at best estimate the probabilities, thus forming the estimated distribution ( )p x . 
3.2.2 The payoff of a decision 
For every decision problem, a DM has a set of available actions { }A a=  from which to 
choose one.  Once an action has been chosen, the DM will receive a payoff, ( , )x aπ , that 
depends on the action a  chosen and the realized state of the world x .  In the example 
problem, the action a  consists of a set of design variables that specify the pressure vessel 
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dimensions.  The payoff function used in the example problem, shown in Eq. (11), is 
highly skewed—the payoff when the vessel fails is largely negative (minus $1 million), 
yet the payoff when it succeeds is only slightly positive (the selling price of $200 minus 
the cost of the material used to build the pressure vessel).  Skewed payoff functions are 
common in applications involving risk where uncommon events with severe 
consequences play a significant role in decisions.  Note that for a given yield strength and 
design, the failure cost is either zero (no failure) or a constant (the cost of the damage, 
lost productivity, etc. when the pressure vessel fails). 
3
( , ) * ( ) * ( , ),
where:
  selling price = $200
   material cost per volume = $8500/m
         true yield strength of pressure vessel
        d














{ max0 if ( )1 otherwise
esign variables (radius, thickness, length)
   cost incurred if vessel fails $1, 000, 000









Direct use of the payoff function in the decision implies that the DM is risk neutral.  If 
the DM is risk-averse or risk-taking, the payoff function should be mapped to a utility 
function according to this risk attitude.  The information economic approach presented in 
this chapter can be used in such situations by performing the same cost-benefit analysis in 
terms of utilities instead of dollars.   
 
By choosing a precise payoff function, we have assumed perfect models of price, cost, 
and demand, models that do not typically exist.  Imprecise value models could be used; 
however, this additional imprecision would translate into larger (less precise) bounds on 
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the value of information.  We chose a precise value model to limit the number of sources 
of imprecision to one (the material strength characterization).  Limiting the sources of 
imprecision allows for a clearer presentation of this new approach. 
3.2.3 Making an optimal decision 
Because of uncertainty in the state of the world x , the DM cannot know the payoff of 
any action with certainty.  We assume that the DM seeks to maximize the expected 
payoff, given by [ ( , )]xE a xπ .  The expectation is taken over all states x because that is 
what the DM is modeling as random.  Note that ideally the expectation is taken with 
respect to the true distribution ( )p x .  Yet, in the example (and in most real world design 
scenarios), the DM does not know the true distribution ( )p x , and must instead use his or 
her subjective distribution ( )p x .  The DM thus makes an optimal decision, a∗  such that 
*
( )a
arg max  ( [ ( , )])p xa E a xπ= . (12)
We deviate slightly from standard notation and write ( )p xE  to emphasize that the DM 
maximizes the expectation, as calculated using his or her subjective probability density 
function ( )p x .  A similar distinction must be made when determining the payoff of the 
decision.  The true expected payoff is calculated using the true ( )p x  that is unknown to 
the designer: 
*[ ( , )]true xE a xπ π= . (13)
The estimated expected payoff according to the designer’s subjective distribution is 
* *
( ) ( )[ ( , )]p x p xE a xπ π= . (14)
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This payoff * ( )p xπ  will in general differ from the true payoff trueπ .  Although Lawrence 
(Lawrence 1999) does not make this distinction in his work, the distinction is crucial in 
cases in which the designer has only imprecise information. 
3.2.4 Information and information sources 
The definition of information varies significantly by subject and application.  In this 
chapter, we modify Lawrence’s definition (Lawrence 1999) and define information as 
any stimulus that changes the recipient’s subjective probability distribution ( )p x  over a 
well-described set of states, { }X x= . 
 
An information source is anything that provides information.  This information arrives in 
the form of a message y  taken from the probability distribution of the messages, ( )p y .  
In the example problem, the information source is the yield strength testing process, and a 
message is the result of a single yield strength test—that is, one observation of material 
strength.  Information economics studies whether it is valuable to pay an information 
source for a message.  Before the message is received, a DM does not know what 
information that message contains, and therefore the DM does not know exactly how it 
will change his or her subjective probability distribution ( )p x  over the state space.  In 
turn, the DM does not know how the message will affect the decision *a  and its payoff.  
Thus, a DM should apply the principles of information economics to arrive at a formal 
metric for determining if the benefit of a message outweighs the cost of acquiring it—the 
value of information. 
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3.2.5 The value of information 
We begin by considering two possible decisions: the first decision is made using the 
current state of information, and the other is made after the receipt of message y.  In the 
first case, assume the DM’s subjective probability distribution of the states is represented 
as ( )p x .  These are the prior probabilities, and the optimal prior decision *0a  is given by 
*
0 ( )arg max  ( [ ( , )])p xaa E a xπ= . 
(15)
After the message y  is received and incorporated into the DM’s knowledge, the DM has 
an updated posterior probability distribution ( | )p x y .  The corresponding optimal 
decision *ya  is given by 
*
( | )arg max  ( [ ( , )])y p x yaa E a xπ= . 
(16)
How can we compare these two decisions?  If we wait until the true state of the world x  
is revealed, we can calculate the ex-post gross value of the message y —where gross 
implies before factoring in cost—for the particular realized state x  as: 
( ) * *0| ( , ) ( , )yy x a x a xυ π π= − . (17)
This represents the amount that the receipt of message y  (and the incorporation of its 
information into the decision) changed the DM’s payoff, given the particular outcome x  
of the state. 
 
The term value is used throughout this chapter in a marginal sense, that is, in terms of 
differences.  The ex-post gross value of a message y  is the marginal payoff of acquiring 
that message—the difference between the payoff of the decision with and without the 
information from message y .  This gross value can be positive, negative, or zero.  It is 
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positive if the message leads the DM to chose an action *ya  that has a higher payoff under 
realized state x  than action *0a .  It is negative if the message in someway misled the DM 
into choosing an action *ya  that has a lower payoff than the prior decision *0a .  If the 
message did not change the choice of action, such that *ya  is the same as *0a , then the ex-
post gross value is zero. 
 
The previously defined ex-post gross value is not useful for determining the potential 
change in payoff of receiving a message because it measures the actual benefit, which 
can only be known after the decision is made and the truth realized.  It is common 
knowledge that a good decision can lead to a bad outcome, especially if a rare, adverse 
state of the world is realized—a situation referred to in the vernacular as bad luck.  
Conversely, a bad decision can lead to a good outcome—a case of good luck. 
   
Rather than assessing the value of a message for a particular state x , a DM is really 
interested in the expected value over all the possible states of the world. The gross value 
of a message y  is defined as the expected difference in the payoff with and without the 
message, such that: 
( ) ( ) * *0gross value [ ( , ) ( , )]x yy y E a x a xυ π π= = − . (18)
Calculating the true gross value of a message requires the expectation over the true 




To complicate matters further, Eq. (18) is valid for analysis of the value of a particular 
message y  only after it is received. However, when the DM needs to decide whether or 
not to purchase a message, the content of the message—that is the particular message y  
from the set Y  of all possible messages distributed according to some ( )p y —is also 
unknown.  When purchasing a message, it is as if the DM is purchasing a sealed 
envelope; he or she does not know what is inside until after buying and opening the 
envelope.  The DM must therefore consider the value of the information source I  instead 
of the value of a single message.   
 
If the DM had access to the true probability distribution of the messages, ( )p y , over the 
set Y , he or she could calculate the gross value of the next message from an information 
source I : 
* *
0gross value( ) [ ( , ) ( , )]y x yE E a x a xπ π= −I . (19)
Because the DM does not have access to the parameters describing the true probability 
distribution of the messages ( )p y  or of the states ( )p x , Eq. (19) cannot be used directly 
to estimate the value of an information source.  In this chapter, we investigate an 
approach for bounding the value of information that incorporates the imprecision of the 
DM’s information state. 
 
A final definition that ties our notion of value back to the fundamental concept of cost-
benefit analysis in information economics is net value.  A message y must be purchased 
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at some cost; resources need to be expended in order to acquire more information.  
Denoting this as cost( )y , the net value of a message is defined as 
( ) ( )* *0net value [ ( , ) ( , )] costx yy E a x a x yπ π= − − . (20)
Similarly the net value of the next message from an information source is: 
* *
0net value( ) [ ( , ) ( , )] cost( )y x yE E a x a xπ π= − −I I , (21)
where cost( )I  is the cost of receiving one message y  from information source I .   
 
If we revisit the DM’s goal of making a cost-benefit tradeoff during information 
collection, we can now state the information economic principle that a designer should 
purchase a message from an information source if the net value of that information is 
positive.  According to Eq. (21), this requires the calculation of expectations across the 
distributions ( )p x  and ( )p y , which in general are not known to a designer.  We return to 
the problem of not knowing ( )p x  and ( )p y  after illustrating the simpler case of known 
probabilities. 
3.2.6 Example with known probabilities 
In this section, we present an example to illustrate the calculation of value of information 
in the hypothetical case of known probabilities.  We later extend this example to the more 
practical case of unknown probability parameters.  While the information used in this 
example is not available to a DM, it is useful for illustrating the basic approach, shown in 













We assume that there is an omniscient supervisor overseeing the experiment.  This 
supervisor knows the true distribution and can perform the actions shown in the gray 
boxes.  These actions are normally not available to the DM.  In this approach, the DM 
begins with the observed set of samples 1{ }ni ix =Σ = .  The goal is to determine whether it 
is valuable to collect an ( 1)stn +  sample given the existing n  samples.  The DM first uses 
this set of samples to construct a best-fit distribution ( )p x , and then to choose an optimal 
design *0a , as shown on the left side of the figure.  The DM then receives a hypothetical 
additional sample jy  from the supervisor.  The DM constructs a new best-fit distribution 
( )| jp x y  and makes a new decision * jya .  The difference in expected payoffs of the two 
decisions is then calculated by the supervisor to determine the true expected gross value 
( )jyυ  of the particular message jy .  This process of calculating the value of an 
additional sample is repeated over many jy  to calculate the average value of the next 
sample for a particular starting set of n  samples, which we denote as ( 1| )V n + Σ . 
 
Recall that the net value of the next piece of information depends on the prior decision 
*
0a , which in turn depends on the existing data samples.  For example, the net value of 
purchasing an 11th sample from the information source depends on the first 10 samples.  
If the initial 10 samples just happen—by chance—to yield very good estimates of the 
distribution parameters, then the net value of the 11th sample will be small, but if they 
yield bad estimates of the distribution parameters, then the net value of the 11th sample 
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could be large.  Consequently, the next step is to repeat the experiment over many initial 
sample sets Σ, which gives the average gross value of the next sample, denoted ( 1)V n + . 
 
The final step of the experiment is to repeat the process for different initial sample sizes.  
By repeating the calculation over many initial sample sizes, we can construct a curve of 
the average net value of an additional sample at different sample sizes, as shown in 
Figure 7.  This figure can be interpreted as follows: at a prior sample size n =32, the 
average net value of an additional sample (the 33rd sample in this case), is about $2.  The 
net value of the 52nd sample, starting from 51 samples, is negative, but the net value of 
the 51st sample is positive.  This means that the 52nd sample is the first sample whose 
average net value is negative; therefore, by stopping at 51 samples the designer will 
achieve the highest expected utility.  Note that this conclusion is drawn using the true 
( )p y  and ( )p x , which are not available to the DM. 
 
























Net Value = $0
Net Value = $2
 




The results can also be interpreted by considering the net expected payoff, which is the 
payoff of the design that would have been realized if no additional information were 
collected, less the cost of the already collected n  samples: 
*
( )net expected payoff [ ( , )] cost( )p xE a x n yπ= − ⋅  (22)
The results are shown for different sample sizes in Figure 8.  Again, because the actual 
observed samples affect the payoff, the payoff of the design is averaged over many initial 
sample sets.  The relationship between this result and the net value of additional samples 
should be clear; the maximum net expected payoff occurs at the same sample size at 
which the net value of an additional sample first becomes negative.  Recalling that the net 
value is defined in a marginal sense, moving from 51 samples to 52 samples means a 
decrease in total payoff of the decision, as is revealed in both plots.   
 



















Figure 8: Net expected payoff of the design 
 
In the preceding analysis, it appears simple to determine the optimal number of samples 
to collect.  However, this simplicity is due to the omniscient supervisor having precise 
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knowledge of the true distributions ( )p y  and ( )p x .  In the example problem the 
information source is an unbiased model of the truth, which means that ( )p y  and ( )p x  
are identical yet unknown—they both describe the unknown true material strength.  The 
characterization of ( )p x  is the DM’s indirect goal for data collection—the DM wants to 
characterize ( )p x  well enough that the design based on the estimated ( )p x  is 
acceptable.   
 
To determine the value of information during the actual design process, the DM needs an 
approach by which he or she can estimate the net value of an additional data sample when 
the parameters describing ( )p y  and ( )p x  are unknown.  We propose an approach that 
uses imprecise probabilities to calculate an interval of net value for an additional sample. 
What performance characteristics should we expect or demand of this approach?  Insight 
can be gained by examining the distribution of the net payoffs about the expected value 
curve of Figure 8.  Box plots for sample sizes of 50, 100, and 150 are shown in Figure 9.  
The plots are constructed with the whiskers at the 0.1% and 99.9% quantiles, and the 
boxes from 25% to 75%.  The extreme skewness of the box-plots is due to the skewed 
payoff function; that is, the cost of slightly under designing the pressure vessel is large 
compared to the cost of slightly over designing it.  The box plots reveal that both the 
variance of the payoff and the chance of a catastrophic result decrease as the sample size 
increases but that, simultaneously, the expected net value decreases significantly.  The 
behavior shown in Figure 9 suggests that a reasonable estimation of the optimal number 
of samples (when the DM has only imprecise knowledge about the true distribution) is 
often well beyond 51 (the optimal stopping point based on expected value), because by 
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stopping at 51 samples, a DM still faces a very large downside risk.  It is important to 
consider the distributions in Figure 8 and Figure 9 when developing an approach for 
determining the value of additional samples; however, in practice, an engineer does not 
have this information available for decision making.  We return to this issue after 
introducing how we will use imprecise probabilities.   
 


















Figure 9: Box plots for various sample sizes 
 
3.3 Imprecise probabilities 
In this chapter, we use a probability-box or p-box (Ferson and Donald 1998), to represent 
imprecise cumulative probability distributions as was explained in the imprecise 
probabilities section of the Background chapter.  While there are several methods to 
construct p-boxes (Ferson 2002), we choose a practical method based on traditional 
confidence intervals on the mean and variance (Aughenbaugh, Ling et al. 2005): 
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By choosing a particular confidence level for the mean and variance intervals, a DM is 
essentially stating that he or she is comfortable assuming that the true distribution lies 
entirely in the resultant p-box.  This assumption is similar to accepting the p-box as a 
model of the truth.  This distinction becomes important in our approach for estimating the 
value of information, as explained in the following section. 
3.4 Estimating the value of information 
In this section, we explain our approach to bounding the gross value of the next message 
from an information source.  We start by describing how design decisions are made.  We 
then motivate the use of imprecise probabilities, describe our approach for estimating the 
value of information, and present a computational experiment that illustrates the results 
of our approach. 
3.4.1 Design decision policy 
According to Eq. (12), the DM chooses the design action that maximizes the expected 
payoff, with the expectation calculated using ( )p x .  This distribution is derived by 
assuming that the material strength is normally distributed and then using the sample 
mean and sample variance of the observed samples as precise estimates of the true mean 
and variance.  Other work has presented a decision policy that incorporates imprecision 
into ( )p x  during the solution phase of the design decision (Aughenbaugh and Paredis 
2005), much as the approach in this chapter incorporates imprecision into the problem 
formulation phase.  Nevertheless, for this chapter a decision policy based on a best-fit 
distribution is used in the problem solution phase in order to isolate the effect of 
accounting for imprecision in the problem formulation phase—that is, to emphasize the 
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contributions of applying information economics.  A noted item for future work is the 
combination of these approaches into one unified approach that explicitly considers 
imprecision throughout the design process. 
3.4.2 Motivation for imprecise probabilities 
One motivation for using imprecise probabilities to represent the DM’s state of 
information is that the use of precise probabilities does not enable useful estimates of 
value. The necessity of an alternative to precise probabilities is illustrated in the 
following example.  Assume that the DM represents his or her state of information ( )p x  
precisely.  Using this information, the DM chooses an optimal design *0a  according to 
Eq. (15), using ( )p x  when evaluating the expectation. 
 
Now assume that the DM acquired an additional data sample y .  With this information, 
the DM can create a new subjective distribution ( )|p x y , where in general 
( ) ( )|p x y p x≠ .  The DM would then choose an optimal design *ya  according to Eq. 
(16), using ( )|p x y  when evaluating the expectation. 
 
If the DM wanted to calculate the gross value of this message y , he or she would use Eq. 
(18), repeated here for clarity: 
* *
0( ) gross value( ) [ ( , ) ( , )]x yy y E a x a xυ π π= = − . (18)
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Ideally the expectation xE  would be taken over the true ( )p x , but the parameters of this 
distribution are unknown.  The DM’s two best options for approximating ( )p x  are ( )p x  
and ( )|p x y .   
 
If the DM uses ( )p x  as the best estimate of ( )p x , we can adopt our notation from 
earlier and rewrite Eq. (18) as: 
* *
( ) 0( ) [ ( , ) ( , )]p x yy E a x a xυ π π= −  (25)
or, by distributing the expectation as:  
* *
( ) ( ) 0( ) [ ( , )] [ ( , )]p x y p xy E a x E a xυ π π= − . (26)
According to Eq. (15), the design decision *0a  maximizes ( )[ ( , )]p xE a xπ , thus 
* *
( ) ( ) 0[ ( , )] [ ( , )]p x y p xE a x E a xπ π≤ . (27)
This means that the gross value of message y  is always estimated to be zero or negative, 
no matter how much new information is available.  Yet intuitively, the gross value of 
additional information should often be positive—acquiring information should improve 
the DM’s ability to make a good decision on average.   
 
If the DM instead used the posterior distribution ( )|p x y , we can rewrite Eq. (18) as: 
* *
( | ) 0( ) [ ( , ) ( , )]p x y yy E a x a xυ π π= − . (28)
Expanding the expectation, we find 
* *
( | ) ( | ) 0( ) [ ( , )] [ ( , )]p x y y p x yy E a x E a xυ π π= − . (29)




( | ) ( | ) 0[ ( , )] [ ( , )]p x y y p x yE a x E a xπ π≥ . (30)
In this case, the gross value is always calculated to be positive or zero, which is also 
unreasonable; there will always be “unlucky” samples, or messages, that lead to a worse 
design.  Another objection to using the precise ( )|p x y  is that it has no use in decision 
making, because ( )|p x y  is only available after the information message y  is collected. 
 
This exercise illustrates that an information collection policy based upon the assumption 
of precisely characterized knowledge about the true distributions is not useful.  The 
principles of information economics cannot be applied meaningfully while using precise 
probabilities, but they can be implemented using an approach based on imprecise 
probabilities that provides useful bounds on the value of information, as described in the 
next section. 
3.4.3 Bounding the value of information 
An overview of our approach is shown in Figure 10.  The DM begins with the actually 
observed set of data samples 1{ }ni ix =Σ = .  The DM first uses this sample to construct a 
best-fit normal distribution and to choose an optimal design *0a —the left side of the 











Recall that by assumption, this model of information—the p-box—contains the CDF of 
the true distribution ( )p x .  The DM discretizes the p-box, as described below, and 
selects a single normal distribution from the p-box to represent both ( )ip x  and ( )ip y .  
Because the information source is an unbiased model of the truth in the example problem, 
these two distributions are identical; they both describe the unknown true material 
strength.  This selected distribution is used to estimate the gross value of collecting an 
additional piece of information through the use of Eq. (19) with ( ) ( )ip x p x=  and 
( ) ( )ip y p y= .  If the DM repeated this for every normal distribution inside the p-box, 
one of the calculated values would be the true gross value of the next piece of 
information.  Clearly, the DM cannot try every distribution, so we propose the following 
procedure. 
 
The DM can partition the p-box into a finite, representative set of distributions.  This is 
done by discretizing the confidence intervals on the mean and variance.  The DM pairs all 
the combinations of mean and variance, resulting in a set of distributions such as shown 
in Figure 11.  Future work will explore more efficient methods for this partitioning such 
as concepts from design of experiments, direct manipulation of the p-boxes, or random 













yield strength (Pa)  
Figure 11:  Various distributions in the P-box 
 
The DM proceeds by selecting one distribution, say ( )ip x , from this finite set and 
assuming that this distribution is the true distribution ( )( )( )ip x p x= .  The DM then 
calculates the gross value of taking the ( 1)stn +  sample, denoted ( 1)iV n + , via a Monte 
Carlo simulation, as follows.   
 
Given the assumed message distribution, ( ) ( )i ip y p x= , the DM can draw a hypothetical 
next sample, jy , from this distribution.  This sample is used, along with the actually 
observed samples i =1{ }nix , to estimate a new posterior distribution ( | )i jp x y .  The DM 
uses this distribution to choose the optimal design, *
jya , for the given distribution and 
hypothetical sample.  The DM then evaluates the expected payoff of this design using the 
assumed ( )ip x , and calculates the gross value ( )i jyυ  of that particular jy .   The DM 
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repeats this for many different 'sjy  drawn from ( )ip y  and calculates the average, or 
expected, gross value of the next message ( 1)iV n +  with distribution ( )ip x  assumed to 
be the true distribution.  Finally, the DM repeats this process for all ( )ip x  in the chosen 
set (from the p-box).  This results in a set of gross values { ( 1)}iV n + . 
 
Recall that if the p-box had been sampled densely, then one of the values ( 1)iV n +  in this 
set would be the true gross value of the ( 1)stn +  sample, given the previously observed n  
samples.  The set { ( 1)}iV n +  would then form an interval ( 1) [ ( 1), ( 1)]V n V n V n+ = + + .  
In our approach, the p-box is only finitely sampled, so the set of values { ( 1)}iV n +  only 
gives an approximate interval, ( 1) [ ( 1), ( 1)]V n V n V n+ = + + , with the lower and upper-
bounds defined as ( 1) min ({ ( 1)})i iV n V n+ = +  and ( 1) max ({ ( 1)})i iV n V n+ = + .  The 
accuracy of this estimated interval improves as the density of sampling from the p-box 
increases.   
 
Based on this interval of value for the next sample, the DM decides if another sample 
should be taken.  If another sample is taken, the process repeats itself starting with the 
larger set of 1n +  data samples 11{ }ni ix +=Σ = .  It should be noted that in general the p-box 
and hence the discretized distributions ( ) ( )i ip y p x=  used in the analysis will be 
different for this new data set. 
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3.5 Computational Experiment and Results 
We now apply the principles of information economics to the design of a pressure vessel.  
The experiment proceeds according to the approach shown in Figure 10 and is repeated 
for sample sizes up to 200.   This generates intervals on the gross value for one particular 
sequence of random samples { }ix .  This experiment is then repeated many times to 
generate multiple sample traces. 
 
Using the approach described above, we can find the bounds on the gross value of the 
next piece of information, ( 1)V n + .  A graph of these bounds for a particular sequence of 
samples { }ix —a particular sample trace—is shown in Figure 12.  A trace represents the 
bounds on the gross value of the thn sample, given a particular set of 1n −  previously 
observed samples 11{ }ni ix −= .  Figure 13 shows the upper-bound, lower-bound, and midpoint 
for two additional traces in the vicinity of their crossing of the cost line—the zero net 
value point.  The curves in the two figures reveal several interesting characteristics, as 
























( 1) [ ( 1), ( 1)]V n V n V n+ = + +
(17) [-10,880]V =
 












































3.5.1 Small sample sizes yield large value intervals 
Figure 12 shows that the potential value of the next sample for small sample sizes covers 
a very large range that is skewed towards the positive side.  For example, the gross value 
of the 17th sample is in the interval [-10, 880].  Based on traditional decision policies, an 
interval bounding zero leads to indeterminacy.  Since a decision must be made, a decision 
policy that can resolve this ambiguity is required.  We assume one extreme—the DM 
stops collecting data when the upper-bound on the gross value is less than the cost—that 
is, when the upper-bound on the net value is negative.  At the accepted confidence level, 
the true value is assumed to lie in the interval, so this represents the point at which the 
true net value cannot exceed zero, therefore, no rational DM would take an additional 
sample.  This is a so-called maximax policy (Berger 1985; Schervish, Seidenfeld et al. 
2003).  Other possible policies for managing interval-based decisions include maximality 
(Walley 1991), maximin (Berger 1985), E-admissibility (Schervish, Seidenfeld et al. 
2003), and the Hurwicz criterion (Arrow and Hurwicz 1972). 
3.5.2 The bounds on value are not monotonic 
In a general sense, it is reasonable to expect that the value of additional samples would 
decrease as n  increases.  However, each trace represents one sequence of actually 
observed samples.  Thus, the gross value of the thi  sample is estimated based on the first 
1i −  samples.  Once the thi  sample is collected, the value of the ( 1)sti +  sample is 
calculated using all i  acquired samples.  If the actually acquired thi  sample is really 
“lucky” or “unlucky”, the gross value of the next sample can change significantly, 
potentially yielding non-monotonic bounds.  An example of such non-monotonicity is 
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labeled in Figure 13.  Non-monotonicity can result in multiple cost line crossings, but 
these crossings were never observed to be more than a few sample sizes apart.  Because 
the bounds are already estimates, a deviation of a few samples is not significant. 
3.5.3 The lower-bound is always non-positive 
It is worth noting that the lower-bound on the interval will always be non-positive, i.e., 
given the available information, it is always possible that the gross value of the next piece 
of information will be less than zero.  This happens because the best-fit distribution ( )p x  
on which the design decision is based is always contained in the set of distribution 
samples from the p-box—it is a candidate for the truth in our approach.  This means that 
during the calculation of the interval on gross value, this distribution is considered as the 
truth at some point, yielding the situation described in Eq. (25)—if the DM’s estimate 
already is the true distribution, which is possible though rare, then no information can 
make the estimate any better; it will in fact often make the estimate worse. 
3.5.4 Examining the net value 
The next point to note is the relationship between the gross value and cost.  In practice, 
there is a relationship between the number of pressure vessels being designed and the 
cost, because the cost of information collection is amortized over all the pressure vessels.  
In this example, we assume that each yield strength test on a material sample costs $0.50 
per pressure vessel, and we proceed to discuss the design of one pressure vessel.  Other 
cost functions could be used without adding significant complexity.  With the cost fixed 
at $0.50, an experiment following Trace A and using the upper-bound decision rule will 
stop with the 147th sample, because the upper-bound on the gross value of the 148th 
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sample is less than the cost, as can be seen in Figure 13.  The same logic can be applied 
to Trace B.  In this case, a DM would collect 162 samples.  At this point, the upper-bound 
on the gross value of the 163rd sample is less than the cost, so the net value is negative. 
   
In this section, we have presented two representative results.  The overall results consist 
of many sample traces that can be analyzed in the same way as the examples above. 
3.6 Comparison of realized payoffs 
With representative results presented in the previous section, we now move to a more 
general discussion.  We examine the realized payoffs based on the described approach 
and discuss alternative decision policies for resolving ambiguity. 
 
Using the true material strength distribution ( )p x —which is not known by the 
designers—an omniscient supervisor could evaluate Eq. (22) to determine the actual 
expected payoff of the optimal design, *a , after each sample.  The results of this 
evaluation for Trace A from Figure 13 are shown in Figure 14.  Each point represents the 
true expected net payoff (y-axis) of a design chosen based on the current number of 
samples (x-axis).  Figure 14 is similar in nature to Figure 8 in the Example with known 
probabilities section; the volatility of the curves in Figure 14 is due to the fact that we are 
investigating the value along a single trace instead of averaging the value of the next 
sample over many traces as was shown to Figure 8.  Because a DM would never create 
all of these designs and does not have access to ( )p x , this is a hypothetical exercise that 




























Figure 14: Actual expected net payoffs for Trace A 
 
The results in Figure 14 indicate that, given the actual observed sequence of samples, the 
DM would have been best-off stopping earlier (at 5 samples) than our approach shows (at 
147 samples).  In this example, the DM loses about 60% of the payoff by collecting the 
additional 142 samples. 
 
Is this a result of the stopping policy?  Because the DM stops collecting information only 
when he or she is absolutely sure that the value of the next piece of information is less 
than its cost, the maximax decision policy is often overly conservative.  An alternative 
policy would be to use the midpoint of the bounds, a special case of the Hurwicz criterion 
(Arrow and Hurwicz 1972).  Using this stopping rule the DM would collect 114 samples, 




Is such a loss in payoff justified?  In the discussion surrounding the distribution of 
payoffs and Figure 9, we conclude that the DM may wish to go beyond the average 
“optimal” stopping point due to the imprecision in the DM’s knowledge and the large 
downside risk of stopping too soon.  The actual expected net payoffs for trace B from 
Figure 13 are shown in Figure 15.  In this example trace, it turns out that given the 
actually observed samples, it would have been much worse to stop after 80 samples as 
compared to 100.  According to Figure 13, the midpoint stopping rule would have 
stopped at 124 samples for this trace.  While this is still about 50% below the optimal, it 
yields a significantly better result than a policy that would have stopped at 80 samples. 
 
























Figure 15: Actual expected net payoffs for Trace B 
 
Before ending this analysis, we present one last trace in Figure 16.  For this trace, the 
optimal stopping point would have been at 110 samples.  In this case, the solution using 
the midpoint stopping rule of 130 samples is relatively close, though still resulting in 
some payoff loss.  What causes the optimal stopping point to be so high in this case?  
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One contributing factor is that the first five actual samples were 192 MPa, 200 MPa, 194 
MPa, 197 MPa, and 181 MPa.  These are all above the true mean of 180 MPa.  This 
initial “unlucky” bias leads to a severe over-estimate of the material strength, which in 
turn leads to a severe under-design of the pressure vessel.  Consequently, the pressure 
vessel fails much more often than expected, leading to a significantly higher average 
failure cost.  This example indicates how sensitive the design can be to the sample data, 
and why a large number of samples may be needed to reach a stable result. 
 


























Figure 16: Actual expected net payoffs, additional trace 
 
Before reaching a conclusion on the effectiveness of this approach of bounding the value 
of information, we must emphasize that the DM would not have the actual expected 
payoff curves available.  Therefore, the DM does not know if he or she is in an example 
similar to that of Figure 14, Figure 15, Figure 16, or something else altogether.  A 
conservative policy therefore leads the designer to keep taking samples until he or she is 
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reasonably assured that there is no chance of a large negative payoff; that is, samples are 
taken until the downside risk is acceptable. 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we have introduced the principles of information economics and related 
them to engineering design problems in which statistical parameters describing 
distributions are not fully known.  The main contribution of this work is the investigation 
of an approach by which the bounds on the value of information can be calculated by a 
designer during the information collection process using imprecise probabilities.  An 
open question is how to make a decision given these bounds on value.  We have 
presented the approach and explored several example situations and decision policies.  In 
Chapter 5, we describe the limitations of the approach and identify areas for future work. 
 
57 
4 An information economic approach for model 
selection in engineering design  
 
 
In Chapter 3, the principles of information economics were used in an approach for 
guiding decisions about statistical data collection in the design process (Ling, 
Aughenbaugh et al. 2006).  In this chapter, an information economic approach is used to 
guide model selection in support of engineering design decisions.  This approach is 
illustrated with an I-beam structure design.  The primary contribution of this chapter is 
the development of an approach for bounding the value of more accurate models using 
imprecise probabilities (Walley 1991). 
 
Throughout this chapter, for simplicity, expected utility is referred to as utility.  If there is 
no probabilistic uncertainty involved in the design, then utility and expected utility are 
equivalent.  In such cases, the DM makes decisions based on intervals of utility.  If there 
is probabilistic uncertainty in the design, which is often the case, then the output of the 
utility analysis will be intervals of expected utilities.  Decisions based on intervals of 
utility and intervals of expected utility are made in an identical fashion, so there is no loss 
in generality by using the designation of utility. 
4.1 Problem definition 
This section provides a definition of the decision problem that is addressed in this 
chapter.  This decision problem is an idealization of common engineering design 
problems; it assumes that the level of accuracy and the cost of the models are known in 
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advance of acquiring and using the models.  This section provides a definition of a model 
and then explains how models are used to guide decisions.  
4.1.1 Modeling definitions 
A model is any incomplete representation of reality (Buede 2000).  In engineering design, 
models are typically based on theory or extensive empirical data; however, even with 
such a rigorous development, it should be acknowledged that “all models are wrong but 
some are useful” (Box 1979). 
 
In this chapter, we assume that model output consists of bounds on the performance of 
the design as a function of a design parameter.  These bounds are derived directly from 
the model output and the model error.  Additionally, we assume that the model error is 
quantified by a multiplicative constant.  A multiplicative representation of error was 
chosen because it is the most common in engineering models.  Multiplicative error is 
typically represented by a statement similar to:  this model is accurate to nominal value ± 
5%, which indicates that the difference between the predicted and actual value is at most 
5%, see Equation (31).  Throughout the analysis we assume that such accuracy claims are 
truthful. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 , 1True Value f x f xε ε∈ − +   . (31)
where, 
( )f x  is the output of the model 




The output of models is typically used to guide decision making.  The DM uses a utility 
function to map model output into intervals of utility, Figure 17.  Once utility intervals 
are known, the DM must either make the design decision based on the utility intervals, a 
decision under imprecision, or choose to develop a more accurate model. 
 
 
Figure 17: Imprecise model output mapped to intervals of utility 
 
When a decision under imprecision is made, the DM must select the most desirable 

























this decision policy and the utility bounds shown in Figure 17, suppose the DM would 
make the decision shown in Figure 18. 
 
 
Figure 18: A decision made under imprecision 
 
What if the decision policy led to a non-optimal decision given the precise utility curve, 
as shown in Figure 19?  In this case, the DM did not make the decision yielding the 
highest expected utility and therefore could have possibly improved the decision through 
the use of a more accurate model.  The DM paid the opportunity cost, shown in Figure 

























Figure 19: The loss in utility due to a decision under imprecision 
 
As models become more accurate the bounds on utility become narrower.  These 
narrower utility bounds tend to decrease the opportunity cost of the decision made under 
imprecision.  However, more accurate models cost more, so a trade-off exists. To make 
systematic decisions about this trade-off, the DM needs some knowledge about the net 
value of model alternatives.  We assume that the cost and accuracy of a model is known 
and show that this information allows us to bound the net value of more accurate models, 
as explained in the next section.   
4.2 Bounding the Value of Models 
In general, the value of a more accurate model is the change in realized utility due to the 
decision change caused by using the more accurate model.  The bounds on the value of a 













































decision policy, the accuracy of the more detailed model, the DM’s utility function, and 
the actual output of the more accurate model:   
prior knowlege, decision policy, 
,
model accuracy, utility function, model output




As more of these factors are taken into account in the computations, the value bounds 
become tighter, but the derivation of such bounds becomes increasingly complex. 
 
In this section, an approach for bounding the value of more accurate models is illustrated 
for four cases.  We start with the case of measuring the value of a model after it has been 
used, since this is the simplest case and provides the reader with an intuitive 
understanding of value bounding.  Next, we determine the bounds on the value of a 
model that outputs the precise utility function.  This case is helpful because it identifies 
the maximum gain in value that can be achieved by using more accurate models.  Neither 
of these cases can be used to guide model selection because the first requires that the DM 
use the model before determining its value and the second relies on perfect models, 
something that does not exist in engineering design.  The third case predicts the value 
bounds of more accurate models considering the Hurwicz criterion (Arrow and Hurwicz 
1972; French 1988).  The fourth and final case incorporates the utility function and 
accuracy of the model into the value bounds computation for the special case of the maxi-
min decision policy.  This fourth case appears to be the most useful for guidance of the 




In all of the cases, we focus on the scenario in which a less accurate model has already 
been used in the analysis.  In this scenario, the DM must either decide to make a decision 
under the current level of imprecision or to acquire and use a more accurate model. 
4.2.1 The value of a model after it has been used 
If the DM decides to acquire and use a more accurate model he or she now has a set of 
refined utility bounds from which a new decision can be made.  By making a new 
decision, the DM has selected some new interval of utility that can be achieved, as shown 
in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20: Updated intervals of utility after a more accurate model has been used 
 
The DM can bound the value of the more accurate model based on the two intervals 
depicted in Figure 20.  For clarity, the intervals of utility have been isolated in Figure 21 















and 1d , respectively.  These intervals represent the possible range of utility for the two 
design decisions.  
 
 
Figure 21: Two utility intervals after using a more accurate model 
 
The bounds on the net value of a more accurate model after it has been used are  
1 0 1 0, ,post postV V U U U U   = − −   . (33)
These bounds can be derived from the two intervals shown in Figure 21.  The maximum 
gain in utility due to the change in decision occurs when the lowest possible utility, 0U , 
would have been realized for the previous decision 0d  and the highest possible utility, 
1U , is realized for the new decision 1d , hence 1 0postV U U= − .  The maximum possible 
loss in utility is the difference between the minimum utility that could be realized given 
the new decision, 1U , and the maximum utility that could have been realized given the 
previous decision, 0U , hence 1 0postV U U= − .   
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4.2.2 Value of a perfect model 
Now that the bounds for an already used model have been derived, we move to the 
simplest case of predicting the bounds on the value of a model, the bounds on a perfect 
model.  A perfect model outputs the precise performance over the feasible design space 
which can be mapped through the utility function to precise utilities.  The upper bound on 
the net value of a perfect model is equivalent to the maximum opportunity cost for 
making a decision under the current level of imprecision.  If the DM cannot tolerate this 
opportunity cost, then he or she should acquire a more accurate model. 
Lower Bound 
The lower bound on the gross value of a perfect model is zero.  The lower bound on the 
value of a perfect model is the most the DM can lose by gaining precise knowledge of the 
utilities corresponding to the design alternatives.  Remember the case in which a decision 
is made under imprecision as shown in Figure 18.  In this case, being given precise 
utilities can either change the DM’s decision or not.  If the DM makes the optimal 
decision based on imprecision, then gaining precise utilities will not change the DM’s 
decision.  In this case, the realized utility of the design remains unchanged and precise 
utility information has zero value.  For the other case, in which gaining precise utilities 
does change the DM’s decision, the DM must be changing from a non-optimal prior 
decision to the optimal decision.  This information leads the DM to a decision yielding 
higher utility and therefore has positive value.  In conclusion, the lower bound of the 
value of a perfect model is zero.   
Upper Bound   
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The maximum value of a perfect model, pV , is the difference between the worst utility 
that can be realized given the current decision under imprecision, 0U , and the highest 
utility that could be realized, maxU :  max 0pV U U= − .  The worst utility that can be 
realized given the DM’s decision under imprecision is the lower bound on the utility 
interval for that decision, 0U  in Figure 17.  The highest utility that could be realized is 
the maximum of the upper bound on the imprecise utility function over the domain of 
interest, maxU  in Figure 18. 
 
For example, the decision and precise utility curve shown in Figure 22 yields the upper 
bound on the value of a perfect model.  The true utility curve shows that the utility of the 
selected design decision is the worst possible 0U , while the optimal decision yields the 






Figure 22: The upper bound on the value of a perfect model 
 
In summary, the bounds on the value of a perfect model are: 
max 0, 0,p pV V U U   = −   . (34)
Although conceptually useful, the value of a perfect model alone cannot guide model 
selection because perfect models do not exist in engineering design practice. 
4.2.3 Incorporating Hurwicz decision policy 
Previously, we derived value bounds based solely on prior knowledge in the form of 
existing bounds on performance.  Now, we add the DM’s selection of the Hurwicz 
decision policy to the value bounds derivation.  Then, we derive the value bounds for a 
special case of the Hurwicz decision policy (the maxi-min decision policy), which allows 
model accuracy and the utility function to be incorporated.  This final derivation is 












































The Hurwicz decision policy is explained in Section 2.4.  The Hurwicz decision policy 
specifies a decision point, Uα , in the interval of utility according to the optimism-
pessimism index, 0 1α≤ ≤ , and the equation ( )1U U Uα α α= + − .  When incorporating 
the Hurwicz decision policy into the value bounds derivation, there are three possible 
cases that must be considered, listed below and shown in Figure 23: 
Case 1)  both decision points lie outside the intersection of the utility intervals and the 
intervals overlap, 
Case 2)  one or both decision points are contained in the intersection of the utility 
intervals, and 
Case 3)  one interval dominates the other interval.  If the utility intervals do not overlap, 
the gross value of all more accurate models is zero (i.e., the DM should not consider 
using a more accurate model).   
 
In this section, we do not make any assumptions about the size of the utility interval that 
will result from using a more accurate model.  The analysis presented here assumes a 
utility interval that results in a worst-case scenario — the largest possible upper bound on 





Figure 23: A list of the possible cases for bounding the value of a more accurate 
model 
 
For Case 1 and Case 2, we must consider the optimism-pessimism index in two parts 
0.5α ≥  and 0.5α <  because the solution changes at 0.5α = , as explained below. 
 
Regardless of the value of α , the upper bound of the value of a more accurate model is 
always the same.  The possibility always exists that the lower bound, 0U , on the utility 
interval for the current decision is realized while the best possible utility, 1U , for the 
alternative not selected turns out to correspond to reality.  Hence, the upper bound on 
value is: 1 0V U U= − . 
 
The lower bound on value is dependent on the utility bounds predicted by the coarse 
model.  Suppose that the coarse model yielded the utility bounds shown in Figure 24.  
From the previous derivation, the lower bound on the value of a model after it has been 














changed from design variable 0d  to design variable 1d  due to the use of the model. To 
find the lower bound on the value of a more accurate model before it is used, we must 
find ( )min postV V= , the minimum lower bound for any more accurate model, given that 
the decision changes.   
 
 
Figure 24: Utility intervals for two design alternatives 
 
Based on our assumptions, the more accurate model can output any reduced intervals of 
utility for the two design alternatives, as long as those intervals are contained within the 
utility intervals predicted by the coarse model.  A possible set of reduced utility intervals 
based on the utility intervals shown in Figure 24 are denoted with solid lines and primes 
in Figure 25.  To find ( )min postV V= , we must isolate the set of reduced utility bounds 
that yield V .  In other words, the utility bounds that maximize 0 1U U′ − ′  (i.e., minimize 
1 0U U ′′ − ), while insuring that the decision changes, 1 0U Uα α′ ′> , where primes denote 




















In case one, both decision points, 0Uα  and 1Uα , lie outside the intersection of the two 
utility intervals based on the output of the coarse model, as shown in Figure 26 for 
0.5α ≥ .  We start by deriving the lower bound on value of a more accurate model for the 


















Figure 26: A set of possible utility intervals 0.5α ≥  
 
To isolate the set of utility bounds that yield V , we must find the set of reduced utility 
bounds that maximize 0 1U U′ − ′ , while satisfying 1 0U Uα α′ ′> .  We isolate this set through 
a constructive proof in which we start by assuming that the more accurate model outputs 
the same utility intervals as the coarse model, see Figure 27.  We then shift the bounds on 
the utility intervals of the more accurate model as necessary to find V .  We can shift the 
utility bounds for the more accurate model as long as the new set of utility bounds is 
















Figure 27: The starting point for the value bounds derivation for which the utility 
interval from the more accurate model (denoted with primes) is equal to the utility 
interval from the coarse model 
 
To satisfy 1 0U Uα α′ ′> , the decision points must first be brought together, since initially 
0 1U Uα α′ ′> ; this can be accomplished by either shifting 1U ′  up or shifting 0U ′  down.  
Shifting either of these bounds directly reduces the quantity that we are trying to 
maximize 0 1U U′ − ′ , so we want to shift them as little as possible while satisfying 
1 0U Uα α′ ′> .  Shifting 1U ′  up by one util (a unit of utility), moves the decision points α  
utils closer, while shifting 0U ′  down one util moves the decision points ( )1 α−  utils 
closer.  For 0.5α ≥ , we have that ( )1α α> −  so we shift 1U ′  up until either the decision 
is changed or the interval is reduced to a scalar, an interval of size zero.  For case 1, the 
decision cannot be changed by only increasing 1U ′ , so the interval of utility for decision 1 
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Figure 28: Reducing the utility interval for decision 1 to a scalar 
 
The unaltered decision point, 0U α′ ,  is now shifted down the distance 10U Uα − , making 
the decision change, i.e., satisfying 1 0U Uα α′ ′> .  To do accomplish this shift, 0U ′  must be 
moved ( ) ( )10 1U Uα α− −  utils downward, as shown in Figure 29.   
 
 
Figure 29: The scenario that yields the lower bound of value for Case 1 - 0.5α ≥  
 
At this point, the decision has changed and the lower bound on the value, V , of the more 








0 0U U′ =


















( ) ( )( )
10
1 0 1 0 1 1 1
U U





















For 0.5α < , the same solution methodology applies except the bounds on utility are 
reduced in the opposite order since ( )1 α α− > , see Figure 31.  First, 0U ′′  is shifted down 
until the interval becomes a scalar, then 1U ′′  is shifted up until the decision is changed 
(where double prime denotes the output of the more accurate model for 0.5α < ). 
 
 















Figure 31: The scenario that yields the lower bound of value for Case 1 - 0.5α <  
 
For 0.5α < , the lower bound on the value of the more accurate model is: 
( ) ( )0 11 0 1 0 0 0
U U













= − +  
(38)
Case 2 
In case two, one or both of the decision points, 0Uα  and 1Uα , lie in the intersection of the 
two utility intervals, see Figure 32.  Instead of shifting both 1U ′  and 0U ′  to find the lower 
bound on the value of a more accurate model, Case 2 requires only one shift, a shifting of 
the bound that has the most effect on the decision point, as shown in Figure 32 and Figure 



















Figure 33: The scenario that yields the lower bound of value for Case 2 - 0.5α <  
 
The lower bounds on the value of a more accurate model for Case 2 are: 
For 0.5α ≥ : 
0 1
1 0 1 0
U U
V U U U U
α α
α
−′ ′= − = − + . 
(39)
For 0.5α < : 
( )
0 1
1 0 1 0 1
U U
V U U U U
α α
α































Solving equation (39) for the maximin decision policy, 1α = , yields a simplified 
formula: 
0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 10 1
U U





= − + = − + − = − + − . 
(41)
0 0V U U= −  (42)
 
Using the maxi-min decision policy, the lower bound on the value of more accurate 
models only depends on the utility interval of the initial decision alternative.  In more 
detail, selection of the maxi-min decision policy implies that the lower bound on the 
utility of the new decision is bounded below by the lower bound on the current decision 
because the lowest bound on any future decision, must be higher than the lower bound of 
the current decision for it to become the preferred alternative.  Hence, the case that 
maximizes the difference of interest, 1 0V U U= − , occurs when the lower bound on the 
new decision is equal to the lower bound of the current decision, 1 0U U= .  Use of the 
maxi-min decision policy is explored in detail in the next section and is the focus of the 
design example. 
4.2.4 Incorporating accuracy and utility 
In the previous sections, the value bounds derivation was based only on the assumption 
that the model accuracy statements are valid over the domain of interest (#2 Key 
assumptions below).  The bounds on value derived from these analyses were bounds on 
any more accurate model, so they could help the DM decide if a more accurate model my 




In this section, we develop an approach that allows us to bound the value of a particular 
model by expanding the results of the previous section specifically for the maxi-min 
decision policy.  Use of the maximin design decision policy allows us to present the 
approach in a simple form that focuses on the model selection decision.  Additionally, we 
assume that we know the cost and accuracy of each of the model alternatives, which are 
essential criteria for selection.  A summary of these assumptions is provided in the Key 
assumptions box below. 
 
Key assumptions 
1. The cost and accuracy of the more accurate model alternatives are known. 
2. Model accuracy statements are valid over the domain of interest. 
3. The design decision is based on a maxi-min decision criterion ( )1α = . 
 
Once the DM has selected the maximin design decision policy, he or she can derive the 
bounds on the net value of a particular more accurate model using the bounds on 
performance given by the coarse model, knowledge about the accuracy of a prospective 
model, and his or her utility function, as shown in Figure 34.  In the method proposed, we 
derive value bounds for a set of design alternatives since we do not know 1d , the decision 
alternative that will be selected after the more accurate model is used.  In contrast, the 
previous value bounding analyses only considered bounds on utility for two design 
alternatives, because we assumed knowledge of 1d .  By selecting two design variable 
alternatives and the corresponding utility intervals from the top-right box of Figure 34, 
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we return to the previous value bounding cases.  We now move to the derivation of the 
value bounds of a particular more accurate model.  
 
 
Figure 34: An approach for determining the lower bound on value 
 
To find the lower bound on the value of a particular more accurate model, the DM begins 
by mapping the known performance bounds to utility bounds using his or her utility 
function, Figure 34 top.  With bounds on utility and a selected decision criterion, the DM 
makes the initial design decision.  This initial design decision corresponds to a preferred 
interval of performance.  This interval of performance is discretized into m  new intervals 
that have width based on the accuracy of the new model.  These discretized performance 
bounds are mapped through the utility function to derive a set of m  possible utility 
bounds 
1..
,i i i mU U =   , Figure 34 bottom.  The lower bound on value is: 
maxU
0U

























































( ) ( )max mini i i iiiV U U U U= − − = − .  For simplicity we explain the approach for finding 
( ) ( )max mini i i iiiV U U U U= − − = −  using an exhaustive discretization, but optimization 
should be used in more complex problems.   
4.2.4.1 Decision Policy selection 
Once the lower bound on the gross value interval for each possible more accurate model 
is determined and the cost of the model subtracted to arrive at net value, it is time for the 
model selection decision.  Model selection requires a decision under imprecision in 
which the intervals of net value of all model choices either contain zero or are entirely 
negative, see Figure 35.  In the example problem, we chose the 0.5α =  Hurwicz decision 
criterion for use in the model selection decision.  The 0.5α =  decision policy allows the 
most preferred model to be selected, as shown in Figure 35.  Once a model is selected, it 
is acquired and used and the model selection process can be repeated with the new model 
serving as the coarse model. 
 
 














4.2.4.2 An approach for model selection 
In the previous sections, we have described an approach for bounding the value of using a 
more accurate model considering the output from the coarse model, the design decision 
policy, the accuracy of the model, and the utility function of the DM.  This section 
summarizes the steps required for applying this value bounding approach. 
 
Making the original design decision: 
1. Define the DM’s preference function over the design variable space. 
2. Select an initial coarse model to begin the analysis. 
3. Use the output of the initial model to bound the performance over the design decision 
space. (See Figure 34 top-left) 
4. Map the performance space to the utility space and select the preferred design 
alternative based on the maxi-min decision policy. (See Figure 34 top-right) 
Bounding the value of more accurate models: 
5. Calculate the upper bound on the value of more accurate models.  The upper bound is 
the difference between the highest payoff obtainable, based on the output of the 
coarse model, and the lower bound on the payoff of the current decision, 
( )max 0V U U= − , Figure 34 top-right. 
6. Determine the cost and accuracy of other possible models.  We assume such 
knowledge is readily available.  For instance, the DM is purchasing the model from a 
vendor and such information is provided by the vendor. 
7. Determine the lower bound on the value of each more accurate model. 
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a. Find the performance bounds for the initial design decision selected in Step 4. 
(See Figure 34 top-left) 
b. Determine the possible performance intervals for the more accurate model 
based on the model’s accuracy and the limiting bounds on performance. (See 
Figure 34 bottom-left) 
c. Map each of the possible performance bounds to the utility space. (See Figure 
34 bottom-right) 
d. The lower bound on value that could be achieved (i.e. the most that could be 
lost) by using the model is ( ) ( )max mini i i iiiV U U U U= − − = − . (See Figure 
34 bottom-right) 
Note:  In steps b. through d. V  is found by discretizing the possible performance 
intervals to make the presentation of the approach clear, but optimization should be used 
to find V  for more complex problems. 
8. Subtract the model’s cost from the upper and the lower bound on the value to arrive at 
the upper and lower bounds on the net value. (See Figure 35) 
9. Return to step 7b. until the net value bounds for each possible model are known. 
10. Select the most desired model based on the net value bounds and the 0.5α =  
Hurwicz decision criterion.  (See Figure 35)   
11. If the chosen model is the current model, stop; else, acquire and use the model 
selected in Step 8.  Return to Step 2.  This new model becomes the new initial model. 
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4.3 Example Problem 
In this section, the approach for bounding the value of a more accurate model is 
illustrated with an I-beam structure design adapted from (Hoff 1956).  A description of 
the design scenario and the computational experiment follows. 
4.3.1 Design Scenario 
The DM needs to design an I-beam structure to resist uniform loading, while satisfying 
deflection requirements, see Figure 36.  The goal is to determine the thickness, t , of the 
I-beam flanges and web that maximizes utility, see Figure 36.  It is assumed that the 









Since the DM wishes to satisfy deflection constraints while minimizing the cost of 
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A sigmoid function was used to approximate the price at which the DM could sell the I-
beam structure, see Figure 37.  This function was chosen for the example problem 
because we believe it is a reasonable approximation of the relationship between sell price 
and maximum deflection. 
 























Figure 37: Deflection value function used in example problem 
 
We assume the DM does not know the exact deflection that will result for thicknesses, t ; 
instead, he or she only has bounds on the deflection, which are derived from the model 
prediction and the maximum error of the model.  The designer therefore must not only 
make the design decision by specifying the thickness, t , but also must make the model 
selection decision by deciding how accurate of a model to use in the specification of t .  
The model selection decision is the focus of the computational experiment. 
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4.3.2 Computational Experiment 
Ansys, a finite element analysis software, was used to construct the models of the I-beam 
structure that were used in the model selection decision, Figure 36.  Similar to the 






ωδ = , where I  is the moment of inertia of the cross section.  The 
Ansys model converges to a slightly different maximum deflection because element types 
188 and 189 are used; both element types consider shear deformation effects in addition 
to pure bending.  For example, with a thickness of 0.043m (1.68in), the predicted 
maximum deflection is 0.0090m (0.353in), while Ansys converges to a solution of 
0.0097m (0.382in).  In general an analytical solution is not available for more complex 
systems.  Consequently, we assume that the DM has no knowledge of the analytical 
solution. 
 
The experiment was conducted as follows.  The number of finite elements used in the 
models ranged from 6 to 192 ( 56 2⋅ ).  For each model the maximum deflection prediction 
was computed for thicknesses between 0.038m and 0.089m (1.5in and 3.5in).  The 
maximum deflection prediction and CPU time were recorded also for each model.  The 
deflection predictions for a model with 384 ( 66 2⋅ ) elements was assumed to be the truth.  
The difference in the predictions between the varying models and the 384 element model 
was assumed to be the error for that particular model.  The maximum percent error taken 
over the design range was recorded for each model and is shown in Figure 38.  Figure 39 

































Figure 39: Computational time vs. number of elements (computational time is 
considered a proxy for total model cost according to the equation 
$1000ModelCost CompTime s= ⋅ ) 
 
For the purpose of this example, the cost of acquiring and using the model is assumed 
proportional to computational time.  Specifically, $1000ModelCost CompTime s= ⋅ . 
 
Now that the cost and accuracy of the finite element models are known for varying 






















preferred number of elements.  The outcome of the application of the approach is 
summarized in the following section. 
4.4 Explanation of results 
In this section, we step through applying the approach for model selection that is given on 
page 82 in section 0 to the example problem.  We then discuss the results that are derived 
from application of the approach.   
4.4.1 A walkthrough of the approach for model selection 
Step 1: Define the DM’s preferences. 
This step was completed when we defined the DM’s utility function, Equation (43).   
 
Step  2: Select an initial model. 
We assume that the DM chooses to use an initial coarse model of 12 elements.   
 
Step 3: Determine performance bounds. 
The performance in this example is expressed in terms of the maximum deflection in the 






























Figure 40:  The deflection bounds based on the output of a twelve element model (a 
thickness of 0.059m was selected based on the maximin decision policy as shown in 
Figure 41) 
 
Step 4: Select a design alternative based on the maximin design decision policy. 
The first part of step 4 entails mapping the deflection bounds from Figure 40 through the 
DM’s utility function to bounds on utility, shown in Figure 41.  Based on these utility 
bounds and the maximin decision policy, the DM selects a thickness of 0.059 m, which 
guarantees the DM of a design with utility of at least $7170.  Figure 40 and Figure 41 


























Figure 41: The utility bounds based on the output of a twelve element model, (a 
thickness of 0.059m was selected based on the maximin decision policy) 
 
Step 5: Calculate the upper bound on the value of more accurate models. 
As derived earlier, the upper bound on the value of more accurate models is 
( )max 0V U U= − .  From Figure 41, we see that max $11330U =  and 0 $7170U = ; using 
these values, we find that $4160V = . 
 
Step 6: Determine the cost and accuracy of other possible models. 
To simplify step 6 for this example problem, we will only consider one possible model 
alternative, a model with 24 elements.  Based on the error curve and computational time 
curve shown in Figure 38 and Figure 39, the maximum error in the model is 2.17%, while 
the model cost is $290.  Remember that $290 is assumed to be an estimate of the costs of 
both acquiring and using the 24 element model. 
 
Step 7: Determine the lower bound on the value of each more accurate model. 
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For this example, the DM needs to determine the lower bound on the value, V , of the 24 
element model.  The procedure for finding V  is summarized in Figure 34.  First, the DM 
finds the performance (deflection) bounds for the design decision selected in Step 4, top-
left in Figure 34.  These performance bounds are 5.7mm and 6.8mm, as shown in Figure 
40.  With these performance bounds, the DM determines the interval of possible 
midpoints for the performance bounds of the more accurate model.  This interval is 
uniformly discretized, the output being a set of possible midpoints for the performance 
interval output by the more accurate model.  Based on the set of midpoints and the 
model’s accuracy a set of performance interval can be constructed, bottom-left in Figure 
34.  These intervals of performance are mapped through the DM’s utility function to 
utility intervals, as shown in Figure 42.   
 
This process is shown for a set of three possible midpoints in Figure 42.  Although three 
discretizations (midpoints) suffice for illustrating the approach, it should be noted that 





Figure 42: Performance bounds mapped to utility bounds, part of the approach for 
finding the lower bound on the value of a more accurate model 
 
To complete step 7, the DM finds, ( ) ( )max mini i i iiiV U U U U= − − = −  the largest 
interval of utility that could be output by the more accurate model.  For this experiment, 
in which we are only considering three discretization intervals, finding V  is simple.  The 
interval that yields V  is circled in Figure 42.  The lower bound on value is 
( )min $7170 $8100 $930i iiV U U= − = − = − .  The DM now knows that the upper bound 
and lower bound on gross value of the 24 element model is [ ], $930,$4160V V  = −  .   
 
Step 8: Subtract the cost of the model from the value bounds to find net value bounds. 
The cost of the model ($290) is subtracted from the gross value bounds to find the bounds 











































Step 9: Find the lower bound on value for the remaining models by returning to step 7.  
We save the reader from this repetition and assume that the bounds on net value are 
computed for all models ranging from 13 to 200 elements.  Once the net value bounds are 
known, they can be plotted, as shown in Figure 43.   
 


























Maximum at 96 elements
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Lower-bound
alpha = 0.5 Hurwicz criterion
 
Figure 43: Net value bounds (initial model = 12 elements) 
 
Step 10: Select the most preferred more accurate model. 
In this step, the DM uses 0.5Uα= , the utility predicted by the 0.5α =  Hurwicz decision 
criterion, to select a more accurate model.  From Figure 43, we see that 0.5Uα=  is 
maximized for a more accurate model with 96 elements.   
 
Step 11: If the selected model is the current model, stop; else, acquire and use the 
selected model.  Return to step 2; this selected model becomes the new initial model.   
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According to step 11, the DM acquires and uses a model with 96 elements.  The 96 
element model now becomes the coarse model and the value bounding analysis is 
repeated to see if a more accurate model is preferred.  We save the reader from such 
repetition and present the net value bounds that are derived based on a coarse model of 96 
elements, shown in Figure 44.  From Figure 44, it can be noted that once a model with 96 
elements is acquired and used, no more accurate model could have positive net value.  
For example, developing a model with 97 elements would lead to a loss of at least $281 
and possibly a loss as great as $390.  Consequently, the DM would stop the analysis and 
make the design decision based on the 96 element model. 
 




























Figure 44: Net value bounds (initial model = 96 elements) 
 
 
Now that we have walked through the approach, it will be useful to further discuss some 
aspects of the approach. 
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4.4.2 The value of the 96 element model after it has been used 
In this section, we use the results from section 4.2.1, “The value of a model after it has 
been used” to compute the gross value bounds of the 96 element model after it has been 
used.    We then subtract the cost of the model from the gross value interval to find the 
net value bounds.  These net value bounds should be a subset of the net value bounds, 
[ ], $400,$3820net netV V  = −  , shown in Figure 43 because the DM now knows the output 
form the 96 element model.   
 
Figure 45 and Figure 46 show the performance bounds output by the 12 and 96 element 
model.  Figure 45 is similar to Figure 41 with the addition of the performance bounds 
output by the 96 element model.  Figure 46 shows a larger picture of the zoom area 
denoted in Figure 45.  We provide this alternate view so that the reader can see the 
similarities between these figures and Figure 21 of section 4.2.1. 
 
 
Figure 45: The performance bounds output by the 12 element model and the 96 
element model (the zoom area indicated is shown in Figure 46) 
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Figure 46: The utility bounds output by the 12 element model and the 96 element 
model (the utility bounds for the decision based on the twelve element model, 0d , 
and the decision based on the 96 element model, 1d , are also shown) 
 
The value bounds for the 96 element model after it has been used are computed based on 
Equation (33): 1 0 1 0, ,post postV V U U U U   = − −   .  Substituting the utility values depicted 
in Figure 46 into equation (33) yields: [ ], $460,$550post postV V  =  .  By subtracting the 
cost of the 96 element model ($290) from this value interval, we arrive at the net value 
interval for the 96 element model after it has been used: 
[ ]_ _, $170,$260post net post netV V  =  .  It is easy to verify that this interval is subsumed by 
the larger net value interval, [ ], $400,$3820net netV V  = −  , that was predicted before the 
model was used in section 4.4.1.  We can attribute the large difference in size between 
these intervals to the large amount of imprecision in the output of the 12 element model.  
The difference in the imprecision about the output of the two models can be observed by 
noting the difference in width of the utility bounds predicted by the two models, as shown 






















4.4.3 The lower bound on value is always non-positive 
As explained previously, the lower bound on value of all more accurate models is 
negative, except for the lower bound on the value of a perfect model which is zero.  Since 
the DM cannot obtain a perfect model, the lower bound on the gross value of every more 
accurate model is negative.  In other words, there is always the chance that a more 
accurate model will cause the DM to change his or her decision to an alternative with a 
lesser payoff.  It should be noted that the possible magnitude of the reduction in payoff 
decreases as the model accuracy increases.   
 
The one exception to a negative lower bound on value is if the DM chooses not to acquire 
and use a more accurate model.  In this case, he or she cannot gain or lose any money; 
hence, both the upper and lower bounds on value of this decision are zero, see the solid 
dot in Figure 35.  In both situations, the lower bound on value is non-positive. 
4.4.4 Model Selection 
In this section, we explore the model selection decision by investigating the net value 
bounds that are computed based on an initial model of 24 elements.  The net value 
bounds for more accurate models starting from an initial model of 24 elements are shown 

































Maximum at 94 elements
 
Figure 47: Net value bounds (initial model = 24 elements) 
 
Note the dramatic difference between the value bounds for the most preferred model 
illustrated Figure 43 and Figure 47.  The selected models are almost identical, 96 
elements and 94 elements.  From Figure 43, the bounds on value of moving from a 12 
element model to a 96 element model are [-$400, $3820], while Figure 47 shows that the 
bounds on value of moving from a 24 element model to a 94 element model are [-$395, 
$645].  This large difference in the value intervals occurs because there is a decrease in 
the relative improvement in accuracy from one model to the next as the models become 
more detailed.  Additionally, these increasingly detailed models cost more to acquire and 
use.  Consequently, as the process of acquiring and using more accurate models proceeds, 
the DM is spending more to acquire and use the suggested models and realizing less 
improvement for the investment. 
 
Figure 48 serves as a summary of the application of the model selection approach to the 
design problem.  It displays the preferred number of additional elements for the more 
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accurate model over the range of possible initial models.  Note that the graph shows the 
number of additional elements; for example, based on an initial model of 10 elements, the 
model selection approach suggests an additional 86 elements, implying that the suggested 
model has 96 elements.  Figure 48 does not provide data for initial models with greater 
than 28 elements because the maximum of 0.5Uα= , the utility predicted by the 0.5α =  
Hurwicz decision criterion, is negative for coarse models with 29 elements or greater.  In 
such cases, the DM would choose to make the design decision based on the output from 
the coarse model instead of acquiring and using a more accurate model. 
 
 




4.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
This section summarizes the results of a sensitivity analysis performed on several of the 
design parameters in the example problem.   There is no model selection approach that 
can be compared to this one in an unbiased way.  Although, an alternate modeling 



































The maximum value of the utility
predicted by the alpha = 0.5
Hurwicz criterion line is negative for




approach has been suggested (Radhakrishnan and McAdams 2005), they assume 
possession of a perfect model, which they use as a benchmark for rating other possible 
model alternatives.  They admit that, when using their proposed framework, the designer 
is left with little guidance in estimating the actual value of different models.  The model 
selection approach proposed here does not assume possession of a perfect model. 
 
It is hoped that support can be built for the soundness of the approach by testing how the 
model selection decision changes based on changes in the design parameters and 
evaluating if the changes are intuitive.  The results of the sensitivity analysis are 
summarized in Table 1.  The base model used throughout the sensitivity analysis is the 12 
element model.  The base design problem is the one specified in section 4.3.  Notice that 
the base case in Table 1 corresponds to the selection of a more accurate model of 96 
elements, in agreement with Figure 43 in the walkthrough.  In the sensitivity analysis, the 
parameters of the problem were modified by multiplying them by a multiplicative 
constant.  The resultant change in the DM’s selection of a more accurate model was 










Table 1: Sensitivity analysis summary 
Parameter Multiplicative 
Factor 
Num. of Elem. 
in Model 
Suggested 
Base Model  96 






















Each of the results in Table 1 appear to agree with intuition.  For example, as the price at 
which the DM can sell the I-beam structure increases, the DM stands to gain more by 
moving closer to the optimal solution; therefore, the DM should use a more accurate 
model.  In agreement with this, the approach suggests that if the sell price is increased ten 
fold from the price in the original design problem, the DM will select to use a model with 
105 elements instead of 96 elements.   
 
The suggested model is more sensitive to model cost.  When the DM uses a more 
accurate model, he or she is more likely to choose design alternatives closer to the 
optimum.  If all more accurate models cost less, the DM should use a more accurate 
model for this thickness selection; whereas, if models cost more, the DM should use a 
less accurate model.  The results of applying the model selection approach agree with 
this.  If the models cost 1/10th as much, the approach suggests for the DM to acquire and 
use a model with 187 elements.  If the model cost is increased ten fold, the approach 
suggests that the DM acquires and uses a model with 45 elements.  Similar analyses were 
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performed with material cost and modeling error, as shown in Table 1.  These results also 
agree with our intuition.   
 
It should be noted that this sensitivity analysis is incomplete because only one design 
parameter is varied from the base model for each case.  A complete sensitivity analysis 
would consider all possible combinations of the parameter variations.  However, these 
limited results are logical; we therefore conclude that the sensitivity analysis supports the 
applicability of the value bounding approach. 
4.5 Summary 
DMs inherently lack knowledge during the design process.  To make good decisions, the 
DM must often reduce the amount of imprecision in his or her knowledge by developing 
and using more accurate models.  The main contribution of this chapter is the 
introduction of an approach for model selection based on bounding the value of more 
accurate models.  We have illustrated the approach for model selection with an I-beam 
structural design.  It was shown that for this problem the model selection approach 
provided guidance to the DM in selecting the most preferred model.  Open questions that 
remain include: 1) What decision policies are most useful? and 2) How can the approach 
be applied to more complex problems with multiple decision variables?  Additionally, it 
may be useful to consider the dependency between the models.  Currently, the models are 
assumed nondependent; this assumption is explained in detail in Chapter 5.  In Chapter 5, 
we describe the approach’s limitations and identify areas for future work. 
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5 Discussion and remarks 
 
 
This chapter concludes this thesis by evaluating the research questions and hypotheses in 
the context of the work presented, by discussing the contributions and the limitations of 
this thesis, and finally by providing suggestions of how this thesis might be fruitfully 
extended in the future. 
5.1 Research question summary and hypothesis evaluation 
An important part of all academic research is the evaluation of the research questions and 
validation of the hypotheses.  In this section, a summary of each of the two research 
questions and their corresponding hypotheses is provided.  Then arguments in support of 
the hypotheses are grouped and evaluated.  This section concludes that the evidence 
allows us to accept the hypotheses, that is, that information economic principles can be 
used to guide decisions about information collection and model selection in the 







5.1.1 Research question 1 and hypothesis 
Research Question 1: 
How should a decision maker decide when to stop gathering statistical data when trying 
to characterize a probability distribution describing a random event? 
Hypothesis: 
The principles of information economics allow the DM to bound the value of the next 
statistical data point and these bounds can guide the DM towards better decisions about 
statistical data collection. 
 
Research question 1 asks, “How should a decision maker decide when to stop gathering 
statistical data when attempting to characterize a probability distribution describing a 
random event?”  It has long been established that if the DM desires a particular 
confidence level for a hypothesis without considering the cost of information collection, 
than statistics can guide him or her in the information collection decision.  In this thesis, 
we have argued that the confidence level is not of direct concern to the DM; instead, the 
DM cares about the value that the information is adding to the final design.  The 
realization that value should guide decision making motivated the hypothesis that the 
principles of information economics could guide the DM towards better decisions about 
statistical data collection. 
 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we derived an information economic approach to making 
decisions regarding statistical data collection.  The chapter started by explaining how 
information economic principles could be applied to the statistical data collection 
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problem and presented a simple example to illustrate the application of such principles.  
Then imprecision was incorporated into the approach using the P-box formalism.  
Incorporating imprecision allowed us to predict the bounds on the value of future 
information.   
 
The value bounding approach was evaluated with an example pressure vessel design.  
The approach allowed us to bound the value of the next statistical data sample.  
Information management decisions were then made based on these bounds.  Section 3.6 
evaluated the quality of decisions made using the approach.  It was shown that in some 
cases, where the DM luckily got a fairly representative starting set of data points, that the 
decisions made using the approach were overly conservative.  However, when the DM 
got an initial set of data points with an “unlucky” bias, the decisions using the approach 
were good.  This analysis was performed using precise knowledge about the true 
probability distribution characterizing the material strength, knowledge that is not 
available to the DM.  Therefore, it was concluded that a designer should keep taking 
samples until he or she is confident that there is little chance of a large negative payoff.  
This conclusion supports using the information economic approach proposed in Chapter 




5.1.2 Research question 2 and hypothesis 
Research Question 2: 
How should a decision maker select the most preferred model given a particular design 
problem? 
Hypothesis:   
The principles of information economics allow the value of more accurate models to be 
bounded.  The DM can use such bounds to guide model selection decisions. 
 
Research question 2 asks, “How should a DM select the most preferred model given the 
particular design problem he or she is faced with?”  Often, model selection decisions are 
not made systematically; the designer has several models to choose from and he or she 
selects one based on his or her past experience or knowledge, group opinion, or some 
other decision criterion.  As for research question 1, we have argued that the DM most 
cares about the value that the chosen model contributes to the design.  The realization that 
value should guide decision making motivated the hypothesis that the principles of 
information economics can be used to guide the model selection decisions. 
 
In Chapter 4, we derived an information economic approach to making model selection 
decisions.  This chapter starts by explaining how models are used to guide decisions in 
engineering design.  Next, the value bounds for models are derived for four cases, some 
of which are meant to assist the reader in understanding the value bounding approach 
while others can be used to practically guide model selection.  The final case 
incorporated the accuracy of the model, the DM’s utility function, the current state of 
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knowledge, and the design decision policy for the special case of the maximin design 
decision policy.  This final case was augmented with information economic principles to 
form an approach for model selection.   
 
This effectiveness of the information economic approach for model selection was 
evaluated with an I-beam structure design problem. The example showed that the 
approach allowed the value of more accurate models to be bounded.  Furthermore, it was 
shown that these bounds could guide the DM in selecting a more accurate model given a 
particular design scenario.   
5.2 Research Contributions 
This section concisely summarizes the major research contributions of this thesis: 
 
1. Information economics was suggested to guide decisions about the formulation of 
simulation-based design problems. 
2. An information economic approach was developed for statistical data collection in 
support of engineering design decisions. 
a. The information economic principles of Lawrence (Lawrence 1999) were 
modified such that they could be applied to the case of imprecise knowledge 
about probabilities.  
b. Using these modified principles, bounds on the value of future statistical data 
were predicted using imprecise probabilities represented as P-boxes. 
c. The information economic approach to statistical data collections was 
explored with a pressure vessel design. 
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3. An information economic approach was developed for model selection in support of 
engineering design decisions.  
a. Bounds on the value of more accurate models were derived for four cases 
based on varying assumptions about the level of knowledge of the model’s 
accuracy characterization, the model’s cost, the DM’s utility function, and the 
selected decision policy under imprecision. 
b. This value bounding approach was augmented with information economic 
principles to form an approach for model selection in engineering design. 
c. The approach for model selection was explored with an I-beam structural 
design problem. 
5.3 Limitations 
During the completion of this thesis, several limitations of the approaches were 
discovered.  The major limitation is that the approaches presented are computationally 
burdensome, especially the value bounding approach for statistical data collection 
presented in Chapter 3.  Additionally, we assumed that if the information does not change 
the DM’s decision, than the information has zero value, an assumption that may be 
limiting for future extensions of this work.  This section describes these two limitations 
such that they can be considered in the further development of the proposed approaches. 
5.3.1 Computational cost 
The information economic approach for statistical data collection that was presented in 
Chapter 3 requires a double-loop Monte Carlo simulation for every sample size.  For the 
example problem, the calculation of bounds on the value of the next sample takes about 5 
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minutes with a high number of p-box and message samples, though results for runs as 
short as 30 seconds appear nearly as good.  These times are on a single 2.6 GHz Pentium 
4 processor system with 512 MB of RAM.  Although this computation time seems 
perfectly reasonable, the computational complexity can be expected to increase 
substantially for more complicated design problems; hence, we recognize that the 
proposed approach needs to be modified for application to complex design problems.  For 
example, some p-box computations can be performed using algorithms with foundations 
in interval analysis that do not require second order Monte Carlo techniques (Williamson 
and Downs 1990; Ferson 2002), and are consequently much less computationally 
expensive on average (Ferson and Ginzburg 1996).  Additionally, new sampling methods 
have been recently derived for propagating p-boxes through black box models (Bruns 
2006; Bruns and Paredis 2006; Bruns, Paredis et al. 2006).  Future work investigating 
how to adapt these methods for computing and simulating directly with p-boxes such that 
they can be used in the proposed approach is needed. 
 
The information economic approach for model selection presented in Chapter 4 is less 
computationally expensive than the approach for statistical data collection, but it still may 
be computationally burdensome for complex design problems.  This approach requires an 
optimization to solve the original design decision, an optimization to find the maximum 
possible utility, maxU , and an optimization to find the lower bound on value of each more 
accurate model being considered.  For the experiment presented in Chapter 4, the 
computation time is negligible, but the computational complexity is expected to increase 
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substantially for more complicated design problems.  Whether such computational cost 
limit the applicability of the approach has not been explored. 
5.3.2 The decision unchanged equates to zero value? 
When the information economic principles were modified to handle imprecision, we 
assumed that the value of the new information could be measured directly by noting how 
the information changed the design decision.  Specifically, the value of information is 
equal to the change in payoff that the DM received based on the new decision.  A special 
case occurs when the DM makes the same decision after the additional information is 
incorporated into his or her knowledge.  According to our assumptions, the value of this 
additional information is zero, since the DM achieves the same utility from the design 
decision before and after receiving the information.  Although, we assume that this case 
yields zero value, it should be noted that the possible payoff interval is reduced in size.  
Such a reduction would often lead to greater DM confidence and therefore may have 
value in that it could change the DM’s behavior in subsequent design decisions.  
Changing the way the value of information is measured may impact the effectiveness of 
the approaches proposed, but such an investigation is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
5.4 Potential extensions 
This thesis lays a foundation for applying information economics to engineering design 
decisions involving statistical data collection and model selection, but there is still 
significant room for improvement and additional exploration.  This section explores some 
of the more promising avenues for future work.  It is hoped that with future work the 
approaches presented in this chapter can be applied to a broader class of problems. 
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5.4.1 Decision making under imprecision 
Additional investigation regarding the selection of decision policies under imprecision is 
needed, both pertaining to the information management decision and the design decision.  
Such investigation could lead to a systematic framework for selecting decision policies or 
heuristic knowledge about which decision policies should be applied to particular 
problem classes. 
5.4.1.1 Decision policies for gathering information 
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we have presented an approach for bounding the value of 
collecting additional data samples and bounding the value of more accurate models, 
respectively.  These value bounds need to be resolved according to some policy in order 
to make a decision.  Given just the bounds, any policy that selects a point between the 
bounds is rational, because the true value is only known to be somewhere between them. 
 
For certain problems, a particular decision policy may be preferable.  For example, in 
Chapter 3, we loosely compare the maximax and midpoint policies for the pressure vessel 
design example and find that the midpoint policy almost always performs better.  If such 
results could be generalized to specific sets of problems, then designers might be able to 
choose an appropriate decision policy based on meta-information about the design 
problem.  This would greatly increase the impact of the approach for bounding the value 
of information presented in this thesis.  Whether such generalizations are possible is an 
open research question. 
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5.4.1.2 Design decision policies 
As mentioned in the “Estimating the value of information” section in Chapter 3, we chose 
a design decision policy based on precise probabilities (the best-fit normal distribution) 
so that we could focus on the effectiveness of using imprecise probabilities to represent 
the DM’s state of information and using this imprecise representation to estimate the 
value of information.  Previous work has shown the value of incorporating the 
imprecision in the DM’s state of information directly into the design decision policy 
(Aughenbaugh and Paredis 2005).  The use of imprecise probabilities for both the design 
decision policy and the prediction of the value of information appears to be a more 
realistic representation of a typical design problem and could possibly lead to additional 
insight. 
 
The model selection approach presented in Chapter 4 is based on a maxi-min decision 
policy for the design decision.  Limiting the work to this decision policy allows for 
simplifications in the approach and computational efficiencies; however, the DM may not 
wish to use such a conservative decision policy.  Generalizing the approach for model 
selection to other common decision policies would be useful.   
5.4.2 Decision problems 
The pressure vessel and the I-beam example used in this thesis are deliberately simple in 
order to clearly illustrate the application of the proposed approaches.  To assess the 
general applicability of the approaches, the design examples need to be varied.  
Specifically, several variations of the decision problems could be investigated.  First, a 
design problem in which there are multiple uncertain parameters and multiple sources of 
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information should be explored.  Such an extension may lead to determining not only 
what model to develop, but also what uncertainties impact the decision most.  Second, a 
decision problem involving both irreducible and reducible uncertainty could be 
considered to investigate how the level of irreducibility impacts the information 
management decisions.  Finally, the effects of varying levels of risk-preference could be 
explored.  Each possible extension would lead to more general conclusions about the 
applicability of the approaches presented in this thesis.  
5.4.3 P-box construction 
When constructing p-boxes, it would be impractical to use 100% confidence intervals, 
since these would be infinite.  For the example problem in Chapter 3, we construct p-
boxes using 95% confidence intervals on the mean and variance and assume that they 
contain the truth (Aughenbaugh, Ling et al. 2005).  It is possible to create p-boxes based 
on weaker assumptions using alternative methods for p-box construction (Ferson 2002).  
Similar to the decision policy work noted above, different p-box construction policies 
may work better for different design problems.  Any such relationships need to be 
explored before this approach can be put to practical use. 
5.4.4 Unknown distribution types 
The p-box formalism can be used to represent the DM’s lack of knowledge about a 
distribution when the DM has varying amounts of initial knowledge (Ferson 2002).  In 
Chapter 3, we investigated how our approach performs when the DM knows the type of 
distribution but has no knowledge about the values of the distribution’s parameters.  
Other possible cases include when the DM can specify a set of all possible distribution 
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types or when the DM lacks any knowledge about the possible distribution types.  In both 
cases, the p-box would be broader resulting in wider value bounds. The applicability of 
our approach could be expanded to other classes of problems by investigating how it 
performs under varying amounts of initial knowledge about the distribution being 
characterized. 
5.4.5 Considering model dependence 
The value bounds that were derived in Chapter 4 are often overly conservative because 
the models are assumed nondependent (Ferson and Kreinovich 2006).  If a coarse model 
and a more accurate model are nondependent, nothing can be said about the output of the 
more accurate model expect that it will be a subset of the output for the coarse model.  
Whereas, models that smoothly converge to an exact prediction would be dependent.  In 
some cases, assuming nondependence among the models is justified; however, in many 
engineering problems the models are dependent and accounting for this dependence 
could possibly lead to better model selection decisions.  An method for accounting for 
interval dependencies has been recently introduced (Ferson and Kreinovich 2006).  
Integrating such a method into the model selection approach could prove useful. 
5.5 Closing Statement 
Thinking of design at the meta-level, i.e., designing the design process, has great 
potential for improving the design of complex systems.  In this thesis, we have 
incorporated information management decisions into the design decision framework.  In 
doing so, we have discovered that there is significant potential for applying information 
economics in the design process.  As more researchers and practicing engineers recognize 
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the value of using information economic principles in the design process, we hope that 







Arrow, K. and L. Hurwicz (1972). “An Optimality Criterion for Decision-Making under 
Uncertainty.” Uncertainty and Expectation in Economics: Essays in Honour of G. 
L. S. Shackle. C. F. Carter and J. L. Ford, Blackwell. 
 
Aughenbaugh, J. M. (2006). Managing Uncertainty in Engineering Design Using 
Imprecise Probabilities and Principles of Information Economics. PhD. 
Dissertation. Woodruff School of Mechanical Engineering, Georgia Institute of 
Technology. Atlanta GA. 
 
Aughenbaugh, J. M., J. M. Ling and C. J. J. Paredis (2005). “Applying Information 
Economics and Imprecise Probabilities to Data Collection in Design.” 2005 
ASME International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition, 
IMECE2005-81181, Orlando, FL, USA, November 5-11, 2005. 
 
Aughenbaugh, J. M. and C. J. J. Paredis (2005). “The Value of Using Imprecise 
Probabilities in Engineering Design.” ASME DETC Design Theory and 
Methodology, Long Beach, CA, USA, September 24-28, 2005, DETC2005-
85354. 
 
Berger, J. O. (1985). Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis, Springer. 
 
Box, G. E. P. (1979). “Robustness in the Strategy of Scientific Model Building.” 
Robustness in Statistics. R. L. Launer and G. N. Wilkinson. New York, Academic 
Press: 201-236. 
 
Bradley, S. R. and A. M. Agogino (1994). “An Intelligent Real Time Design 
Methodology for Component Selection: An Approach to Managing Uncertainty.” 
Journal of Mechanical Design, 116(December): 980-988. 
 
Bruns, M. (2006). Propagation of Imprecise Probabilities through Black Box Models. 
Thesis. Woodruff School of Mechanical Engineering, Georgia Institute of 
Technology. Atlanta GA. 
 
Bruns, M. and C. J. J. Paredis (2006). “Numerical Methods for Propagating Imprecise 
Uncertainty.” ASME DETC Design Automation Conference, Philadelphia, PA, 
USA, September 10-13, 2006, DETC2006-99237. 
 
Bruns, M., C. J. J. Paredis and S. Ferson (2006). “Computational Methods for Decision 
Making Based on Imprecise Information.” Reliable Engineering Computing 




Buede, D. M. (2000). The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods. New 
York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
Ciocoiu, M., M. Gruninger and D. Nau (2001). “Ontologies for Integrating Engineering 
Applications.” ASME Journal of Computing and Information Science in 
Engineering, 1(1): 12-22. 
 
Clemen, R. T. (1996). Making Hard Decisions. Pacific Grove, CA, Brooks/Cole 
Publishing Company. 
 
de Finetti, B. (1974). Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment. New 
York, Wiley. 
 
de Finetti, B. (1980). “Foresight.  Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources (Translated).” 
Studies in Subjective Probability. H. E. Kyburg and H. E. Smokler, E. Krieger 
Publishing Company. 
 
Ferson, S. (2002). “Ramas Risk Calc 4.0.” New York, Lewis Publishers. 
 
Ferson, S. and S. Donald (1998). “Probability Bounds Analysis.” International 
Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management (PSAM4), New 
York, Springer-Verlag, 1203-1208. 
 
Ferson, S. and L. Ginzburg (1996). “Different Methods Are Needed to Propagate 
Ignorance and Variability.” Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 54(2-3). 
 
Ferson, S., J. Hajagos, D. S. Myers and W. T. Tucker (2005). “Constructor: Synthesizing 
Information About Uncertain Variables.” Applied Biomathematics for Sandia 
National Laboratories. 20 September 2005. http://www.ramas.com/construct.pdf.  
 
Ferson, S. and V. Kreinovich (2006). “Modeling Correlation and Dependence among 
Intervals.” NSF Workshop on Reliable Engineering Computing, Savannah, GA, 
February 22-24, 115-126. 
 
Fishburn, P. (1982). Foundations of Expected Utility. D. Reidel Publishing Company. 
 
French, S. (1988). Decision Theory: An Introduction to the Mathematics of Rationality. 
Chichester, Ellis Horwood. 
 
Gupta, S. K. and C. Xu (2002). “Estimating the Optimal Number of Alternatives to Be 
Explored in Large Design Spaces: A Step Towards Incorporating Decision 
Making Cost in Design Decision Models.” ASME DETC Computers and 





Hazelrigg, G. A. (1996). Systems Engineering: An Approach to Information-Based 
Design. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall. 
 
Hines, W. W., D. C. Montgomery, D. M. Goldsman and C. M. Borror (2003). Probability 
and Statistics in Engineering. Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
Hoff, N. J. (1956). Analysis of Structures. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
Howard, R. A. (August 1966). “Information Value Theory.” IEEE Transactions on 
Systems Science and Cybernetics, SCC-2(1): 22-26. 
 
Howard, R. A. (November 1965). “Bayesian Decision Models for Systems Engineering.” 
IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, SSC-1(1): 36-40. 
 
Jayaram, S., J. Vance, R. Gadh, J. Jayaraman and H. Srinivasan (2001). “Assessment of 
VR Technology and Its Applications to Engineering Problems.” ASME Journal of 
Computing and Information Science in Engineering, 1(1): 72-83. 
 
Joslyn, C. A. and J. M. Booker (2005). “Generalized Information Theory for Engineering 
Modeling and Simulation.” Engineering Design Reliability Handbook. E. 
Nikolaidis, D. M. Ghiocel and S. Singhal. New York, CRC Press: 9.1-9.40. 
 
Keeney, R. and H. Raiffa (1993). Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and 
Value Tradeoffs. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kmietowicz, Z. and A. Pearman (1984). “Decision Theory, Linear Partial Information 
and Statistical Dominance.” International Journal of Management Science, 12(4): 
391-399. 
 
Law, A. M. and D. W. Kelton (2000). Simulation Modeling and Analysis. St. Louis, 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
Lawrence, D. B. (1999). The Economic Value of Information. New York, Springer-
Verlag. 
 
Layard, R. and S. Glaister, Eds. (1994). Cost-Benefit Analysis (2nd Edition). Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lieberman, M. and R. Hall (2000). Introduction to Economics, South-Western College 
Publishing. 
 
Ling, J. M., J. M. Aughenbaugh and C. J. J. Paredis (2006). “Managing the Collection of 
Information under Uncertainty Using Information Economics.” Journal of 




Marschak, J. (1974). Economic Information, Decision, and Prediction: Selected Essays. 
Boston, D. Reidel Publishing Company. 
 
Marston, M., J. K. Allen and F. Mistree (2000). “The Decision Support Problem 
Technique: Integrating Descriptive and Normative Approaches in Decision Based 
Design.” Engineering Valuation and Cost Analysis, 3: 107-129. 
 
Matheson, J. E. (September 1968). “The Economic Value of Analysis and Computation.” 
IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, SSC-4(3): 325-332. 
 
Pahl, G. and W. Beitz (1996). Engineering Design: A Systematic Approach. London, 
Springer Publishing. 
 
Pratt, J. W., H. Raiffa and R. Schlaifer (1995). Introduction to Statistical Decision 
Theory. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press. 
 
Radhakrishnan, R. and D. A. McAdams (2005). “A Methodology for Model Selection in 
Engineering Design.” Journal of Mechanical Design, 127(May): 378-387. 
 
Rangan, R. M. and B. Chadha (2001). “Engineering Information Management to Support 
Enterprise Business Processes.” ASME Journal of Computing and Information 
Science in Engineering, 1(1): 32-40. 
 
Rubin, M. R. (1983). Information Economics and Policy in the U.S. Littleton, CO, USA, 
Libraries Unltd. 
 
Sarin, R. K. (1978). “Elicitation of Subjective Probabilities in the Context of Decision-
Making.” Decision Sciences, 9: 37-48. 
 
Savage, L. J. (1972). The Foundation of Statistics. New York, Dover Publications. 
 
Schervish, M. J., T. Seidenfeld, J. B. Kadane and I. Levi (2003). “Extensions of Expected 
Utility Theory and Some Limitations of Pairwise Comparisons.” International 
Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications. Lugano, 
Switzerland. 
 
Strassmann, P. A. (1999). Information Productivity, Information Economics Press. 
 
Strassmann, P. A. (2004). “The Foundations of Information Economics - Part I.” 
Information Economics Journal. 
 
Szykman, S., R. Sriram and W. C. Regli (2001). “The Role of Knowledge in Next-
Generation Product Development Systems.” ASME Journal of Computing and 




Thurston, D. L. (1990). “Subjective Design Evaluation with Multiple Attributes.” 1990 
ASME Design Technical Conferences, Design Theory and Methodology, 
September 16-19 1990, Chicago, IL, USA, ASME, New York, NY, 355-361. 
 
Urban, S. D., S. W. Dietrich, A. Saxena and A. Sundermier (2001). “Interconnection of 
Distributed Components: Current Middleware Solutions.” ASME Journal of 
Computing and Information Science in Engineering, 1(1): 23-31. 
 
von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern (1980). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
Third Edition. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. 
 
Wald, A. (1950). Statistical Decision Functions, John Wiley. 
 
Walley, P. (1991). Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities. New York, 
Chapman and Hall. 
 
Weber, M. (1987). “Decision Making with Incomplete Information.” European Journal 
of Operational Research, 28: 44-57. 
 
Williamson, R. C. and T. Downs (1990). “Probabilistic Arithmetic I: Numerical Methods 
for Calculating Convolutions and Dependency Bounds.” International Journal of 
Approximate Reasoning, 4: 89-158. 
 
Winkler, R. L. (1996). “Uncertainty in Probabilistic Risk Assessment.” Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, 54(2-3): 127-132. 
 
 
 
